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RECENT CASES
Civil Rights-Desegregation-School Authorities Have
Affirmative Duty To Make a Reasonable Inquiry into the
Purposes of a Prospective Purchaser of Public School
Property
Black citizens of Tate County, Mississippi, brought suit' seeking
rescission of the County Board of Education's sale of a public school
to a foundation that used the property to establish a private, segregated'
academy. Respondent, Tate County Board of Education, had deter-
mined that the continued operation 3 of the dilapidated school would be
uneconomical and had conveyed the property to a private citizen without
knowing the purpose for which the school was to be used. The purchaser
later conveyed the property 4 to the Tate County Foundation, which
established a private, segregated academy. Petitioners contended that the
sale violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
because it encouraged and fostered racially segregated education. The
district court refused to invalidate the sale of the school on the grounds
that there was no showing of illegality or bad faith by the school board
in disposing of the property. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, held, reversed. In order to bring about a unitary school system,
a school board has the affirmative duty to make a reasonable inquiry
I. The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343
(1970), seeking equitable relief against the County Board of Education and, by later amendment,
against the purchaser who was acting as agent for a citizen group that later became the Tate County
Foundation.
2. After the petitioners filed suit, the Foundation instituted a nondiscriminatory admissions
policy; however all the faculty and students were white. The total absence of applications from black
students was caused largely by the tuition of $450, which was beyond the means of most Negroes
in Tate County. McNeal v. Tate County School Dist., No. 30722 (5th Cir., Sept. 17, 1971).
3. It was not contended that the school board lacked valid reasons for selling the school,
which was constructed in 1941. During the 1969 school year, only 3 of the 7 classrooms were
utilized, and 35 children of both races attended.
4. The school board conveyed the school to the private citizen, who was the only bidder, on
January 7, 1970; workmen began repairs on the building in February 1970, and the Foundation
took possession on June I, 1970. The short time span between the transactions at least creates a
presumption that the intention to establish a segregated school existed when the property was
purchased from the school board. Had the time period between the purchase of the school from
the board and the sale to the foundation been considerably longer, the result of the case might have
been different.
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into the purposes of a prospective purchaser of public school property
and must refuse to sell to one who intends to establish a racially segre-
gated school on the premises. McNeal v. Tate County School District,
No. 30722 (5th Cir., Sept. 17, 1971).
In the first Brown v. Board of Education5 decision, the Supreme
Court held that racial discrimination in public education violates the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Brown II,1 the
Court placed the primary responsibility for creating such a desegregated
public school system on each local school authority and stated that the
district courts were to determine whether the' school authorities were
complying with the constitutional mandate of Brown .' Because ten
years after Brown only 2.25 percent of Negro school children in the
South were attending desegregated schools,8 Congress enacted Titles IV
and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 which shifted some of the
burden of implementing school desegregation from the federal courts to
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)."0 The stat-
ute conditioned the receipt of federal financial assistance upon the exist-
ence of a nondiscriminatory school system. The HEW Office of Educa-
tion issued guidelines12 that provided three methods by which a school
district could qualify for federal financial assistance, one of which re-
quired the district to show that it was subject to a final court order
requiring desegregation of the school system.' 3 School boards, however,
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Due to the complex nature of the transition
to a desegregated public school system, the Court in Brown I requested further argument on the
question of relief. The administration of this relief is the subject of Brown I.
7. Id. at 299. Although no absolute time limit was set, the Court ordered school boards to
comply at the earliest practicable date, and directed district courts to ensure that efforts to end
racial discrimination proceeded with all deliberate speed. Id. at 300-01.
8. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, table I at 903 (5th Cir.
1966), affd on rehearing, 380 F.2d 385 (en banc), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). In 1964, the
Supreme Court, in reexamining the "deliberate speed" standard, found that there had been "too
much deliberation and not enough speed." Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 229 (1964);
see Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963) (delay in desegregating recreational facilities).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c, 2000d to -4 (1970).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2 (1970) authorizes HEW's Commissioner of Education to render
technical assistance to any school board that applies for help in implementing desegregation plans.
HEW issued regulations to effectuate the provisions of Title VI. 45 C.F.R. § 80 (1971).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970) provides that no person in the United States shall be discrimi-
nated against on the basis of race, color, or national origin in any program or activity receiving
federal assistance.
12. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 1966-67, at
10-19 (1967).
13. The other 2 alternatives with which a school district could comply and still obtain federal
financial assistance were: (1) it could submit an HEW form assuring compliance if the district was
completely desegregated, or (2) it could submit its own plan for the desegregation of the school
system for the Commissioner of Education's approval. Id. at 11.
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were able to circumvent the purpose of the HEW guidelines by obtaining
a federal court order approving a desegregation plan that differed signifi-
cantly from the plans set forth in the guidelines. In United States v.
Jefferson County Board of Education, 5 the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals attempted to foreclose the use of this avoidance device and held
that state school authorities have an affirmative duty under the four-
teenth amendment to establish a unitary school system in areas where
the schools had been segregated on a de jure basis."6 The court, in holding
that the HEW guidelines set forth the minimum standards to be applied
toward achieving desegregation, stated that the "only school desegrega-
tion plan that meets constitutional standards is one that works."' 17 On
rehearing, the court further stated that if one desegregation plan 8 proves
to be ineffective, the school authorities are under an affirmative duty to
adopt other methods that would accomplish the desired result of con-
verting a dual system into a unitary system, which would in turn provide
educational opportunities on equal terms to all." In order to establish
14. "The lack of clear and uniform standards to govern school boards has tended to put a
premium on delaying actions. In sum, the lack of uniform standards has retarded the development
of local responsibility. ... United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 861
(5th Cir. 1966); see Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 355 F.2d 865 (5th Cir.
1966) (administrative transitionary period no justification for denial of a constitutional right); Price
v. Denison Independent School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 348 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1965) (grade-a-year
plan inadequate). For excellent discussions of the practical application of the HEW guidelines see
Dunn, Title VI, The Guidelines and School Desegregation in the South, 53 VA. L. REV. 42 (1967);
Comment, The Courts, HEWand Southern School Desegregation, 77 YALE L.J. 321 (1967).
15. 372 F.2d 836. In the 7 cases before the court the first district to move toward desegrega-
tion began its efforts in 1965, 11 years after Brown I. In all of the cases only a vigorously contested
court order stimulated the school officials to act. 372 F.2d at 845 n.3.
16. Courts have interpreted Brown as applying only to "de jure segregation"--deliberate
separation of the races by state law-which furnishes the state action necessary under the fourteenth
amendment. The courts have not applied Brown to "de facto segregation" which has been defined
as the fortuitous result of segregated housing and adherence to neighborhood school plans rather
than as a result of state action. See, e.g., Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988, 998 (10th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965); Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The
Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. RaV. 564 (1965); Wright, Public School Desegregation:
Legal Remedies For De Facto Segregation, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 285 (1965); Note, Constitutional
Law-School Desegregation-The Conundrum of De-Facto And De-Jure Segregation, 18 DE PAUL
L. REV. 305 (1968).
17. 372 F.2d at 847.
18. At issue was a freedom-of-choice plan that allowed the student or his parents to choose
the school which the student would attend, providing space was available. These plans were ap-
proved by HEW as a permissible means of desegregation and were the popular method adopted by
southern states after the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plans were ineffective, but gave the appear-
ance that the authorities were complying with their duty to desegregate the public schools. 372 F.2d
at 888-89 & nn. 110-12.
19. 380 F.2d at 390.
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some standard by which a lower court could determine whether a deseg-
regation plan is effective, the Supreme Court in Green v. County School
Board of New Kent County20 stated that there must be a finding that
the authorities are proceeding in good faith toward the dismantling of
state-imposed segregation, and required that the new plan must promise
meaningful and immediate progress. 21 The Court further noted that a
lack of good faith might be indicated if more productive courses of
action were available than the one chosen by the school authorities. 1 The
scope of a school board's affirmative duty thus was defined to include
not only the duty to act positively, but also to act by selecting the best
means available to desegregate public education at the earliest practica-
ble date. Recent cases have focused on the question whether specific
activities by school boards comply with the affirmative duty defined by
the Supreme Court. In Wright v. City of Brighton,'23 the Fifth Circuit
was called upon to determine whether a city had met its affirmative good
faith duty when it sold an abandoned school building to a private group,
even though the city knew the buyers were going to establish a private,
segregated academy with the property. The court rescinded the sale on
the grounds that it was made with the knowledge and purpose of encour-
aging racial discrimination and was not a good faith effort by the city
to implement a unitary system. The court noted that the sale alone, and
not any involvement by the city in the operation of the academy, consti-
tuted the state action that violated the petitioner's rights to equal protec-
tion.24 In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,-5 the
most recent pronouncement in the area, the Supreme Court more pre-
cisely defined the scope of the affirmative duty of school officials by
stating that it was the joint responsibility of the school boards and the
courts to see to it that future school construction and disposition of
school property do not perpetuate or reestablish the dual system. 26
In the instant case, the court first observed that the school board
members were cognizant of both local and statewide movements to avoid
the impact of integration by establishing private schools. The court
noted that no effort was made to investigate the obvious possibility that
20. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
21. Id. at 439.
22. Id.; see Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968) (free-transfer plan unaccepta-
ble); Raney v. Board of Edue., 391 U.S. 443 (1968) (freedom-of-choice plan inadequate).
23. 441 F.2d447{SthCir. 1971).
24. Id. at 452-53.
25. 402 U.S. 1(1971).
26. Id. at 21.
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the property in question might become a segregated academy after it was
sold. The court did not contest the district court's findings that the
school board had made a good faith determination that the continued
operation of the school would be uneconomical and that the purchase
price was adequate;2 they stated, however, citing Wright v. City of
Brighton,78 that the establishment of a private, all-white school had the
ultimate effect of placing a special burden on the black citizens of the
community, and that the city, by its sale of the school, encouraged the
maintenance of a segregated facility. 29 Since school boards are charged
with the affirmative duty to take all necessary steps to bring about a
unitary educational system free from racial discrimination, the court
held that this duty included making a reasonable inquiry into the pur-
poses of a prospective purchaser when the school property is located in
an area where it is common practice to establish private schools to avoid
the impact of court-ordered integration.
30
In the instant case, the Fifth Circuit has demonstrated that it will
not hesitate to impose a heavy burden on school boards31 in order to
prevent delay in the establishment of a unitary school system. A contrary
result would have left a large loophole for school boards that sought to
frustrate desegregation efforts; 32 any such board could have sold to a
27. The court also did not disagree with the district court's finding that the Foundation
intended to establish a private school in order to avoid the impact of integration resulting from the
adoption of a unitary school plan by the school board.
28. 441 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1971).
29. Although the court noted that the city of Brighton had actual knowledge that the sale
would result in the creation of an all-white segregated school whereas here the school board was
not aware of the purpose of the purchaser, it found the distinction inconsequential and refused to
allow the school board to ignore local conditions and then claim lack of actual knowledge.
30. Judge Gewin dissented on the grounds that the majority invalidated the sale despite
accepting the district court's findings that the sale was made in good faith and for sound economic
and educational reasons; he expressed concern that the majority's refusal to say exactly what type
inquiry must be made forces a school board that wants to be completely safe to include a covenant
running with the land in the deed forbidding the property's use as a segregated school. No. 30722
at 9 (Gewin, J., dissenting).
31. In addition to the purchase price, the school board will have to refund at least some of
the approximately $20,000 the Foundation had spent on improvements. The burden operates exten-
sively on the Foundation as well, for in addition to the money spent, considerable free labor had
been donated by many interested in the Foundation.
32. See, e.g., Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968) (free transfer plan); Green
v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (freedom-of-choice plan); Griffin v. County School Bd.,
377 U.S. 218 (1964) (closing of public schools); Aaron v. McKinley, 173 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Ark.),
affd mem. sub nom., Faubus v. Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959) (statute cutting off state funds to
integrated school districts). For discussions of the recent history of school desegregation efforts see
Gozansky, Gignilliat, & Horwitz, School Desegregation in the Fifth Circuit, 5 HOUSTON L. REv.
946 (1968); Note, Desegregation of Public Schools: An Affirmative Duty To Eliminate Racial
Segregation Root And Branch, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv. 946 (1968); Comment, The Courts, HEW,
and Southern School Desegregation, 77 YALE L.J. 321 (1967).
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private group if the board had made a good faith determination that the
operation of the school was no longer economically feasible and if the
board had no actual knowledge of the use to which the school would be
put. Inherent in the decision is the recognition that the establishment of
large numbers of private, all-white schools has retarded significantly the
integration effort,33 and the court again has served notice that state
action which results in the establishment of these private academies will
not be condoned. By failing to define more precisely the scope of the
school board's duty, however, the court created the possibility that its
decision actually will serve to deter the development of unitary school
systems by restricting the marketability of school property. In order to
ensure that it is fulfilling its duty, a school board may feel compelled to
include a clause in the contract of sale preventing the property from
being used as a segregated school. Interested parties might be unwilling
to purchase the property if there is a binding restriction on its use even
though, at the time, the purchaser has no intention of either establishing,
or reselling to those who intend to establish, a private, segregated school.
At the same time, school boards are in need of revenue to finance devel-
opment of unitary school systems. Since the uses to which old school
buildings may be put are limited, a restraint on their marketability may
prove to be a significant barrier to a school district's ability to raise
funds. If a school board makes a determination in good faith that a
school building has outlived its usefulness, the standard for inquiry into
the purposes of a prospective purchaser should not be so stringent that
it will deprive the board of the much needed funds that such a sale would
bring to the educational system.
33. The Fifth Circuit previously has been aware that integration has caused a substantial
number of white students to withdraw from the public school system. See United States v. Hinds
County School Bd., 433 F.2d 605, 609 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 848-49 (5th Cir. 1966). For an excellent discussion of the role private schools
play see Note, The Wall of Racial Separation: The Role of Private and Parochial Schools in Racial
Integration, 43 N.Y.U.L. R~v. 514 (1968).
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Communications-FCC Renewal Hearings-1970 Pol-
icy Statement Denying Full Comparative Hearings Vio-
lates Section 309(e) of the Communications Act of 1934
Plaintiffs, two organizations formed to improve the position of
minority groups in the broadcasting industry' and two applicants for
television channels, 2 challenged the legality of the defendant Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) 1970 Policy Statement,3 which set
forth the substantive and procedural guidelines for comparative hear-
ings4 regarding renewal applications for broadcasting licenses. 5 Plaintiffs
I. Plaintiffs, Citizens Communications Center (CCC) and Black Efforts for Soul in Televi-
sion (BEST), are organized to improve the position of minority groups in the broadcasting industry
and to make existing stations more responsive to the communities they serve.
2. Plaintiffs, Hampton Roads Television Corporation (Virginia) and Community Broadcast-
ing of Boston, Inc., are applying for television channels.
3. On January 15, 1970, theFCC promulgated its Policy Statement Concerning Comparative
Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970). The Policy Statement
"calls for the balancing of two obvious considerations. The first is that the public receive the
benefits of the statutory spur inherent in the fact that there can be a challenge, and indeed, where
the public interest so requires, that the new applicant be preferred. The second is that the compara-
tive hearing policy in this area must not undermine predictability and stability of broadcast opera-
tions.
"We believe that these two considerations call for the following policy-namely, that if the
applicant for renewal of license shows in a hearing with a competing applicant that its program
service during the preceding license term has been substantially attuned to meeting the needs and
interests of its area, and that the operation of the station has not otherwise been characterized by
serious deficiencies, he will be preferred over the newcomer and his application will be
granted. ... 22 F.C.C.2d at 424-25.
4. The Commission has always dealt with applicants on a comparative basis, rather than
judging each applicant on an absolute standard because the number of applications exceeds the
number of available broadcasting frequencies. Thus, the Commission's task has been to choose the
applicant that will best serve the public.
5. The opinion incorporates 3 separate suits against the FCC. In the first action CCC and
BEST filed a petition pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1970) and 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (1970) seeking
to review (1) the FCC's Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular
Renewal Applicants; (2) the Commission's memorandum opinion dismissing plaintiff's request to
codify standards for all comparative hearings; and (3) the FCC's order denying reconsideration of
the 1970 Policy Statement. In the second action, Hampton Roads Television Corporation and
Community Broadcasting of Boston, Inc., 2 corporations %eeking to challenge incumbent stations
in Norfolk, Virginia, and Boston, Massachusetts, respectively, sought review of (2) and (3) above.
The last action, brought by CCC and BEST, was an appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint seeking to have the court enjoin
the FCC from further policy decisions regarding standards applicable to comparative broadcast
license renewal proceedings without first giving all interested parties notice and an opportunity to
be heard pursuant to § 4 of the Administrative Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). This last case was
considered moot by the instant court because of its decision regarding the first 2 actions. Citizens
Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
1972]
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contended that the Policy Statement, which grants a controlling prefer-
ence to an incumbent licensee if it demonstrates substantial past per-
formance without serious deficiencies, is unlawful under the "full com-
parative hearing" requirement of section 309(e) of the Communications
Act of 1934.6 The FCC maintained that the Policy Statement was a
lawful exercise of the Commission's authority and that it represented a
legitimate effort to balance the need for predictability and stability
within the broadcasting industry with the desire for a constructive level
of competition. 7 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, held, judgment for plaintiffs.' The FCC's 1970
Policy Statement violates section 309(e) of the Communications Act of
1934 because it denies an applicant for a broadcasting license a full
comparative hearing if the incumbent has a record of substantial service
to the community without serious deficiencies. Citizens Communica-
tions Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
The first license requirement within the broadcasting industry was
set forth by the Federal Radio Act of 1927, which required that a three-
year license be awarded to all broadcasting stations on the basis of
"public interest, convenience, or necessity." ' When there were compet-
ing applicants, a license was granted to that applicant who, in the judg-
ment of the Commission, 10 would best serve the public good. Seven years
later, Congress enacted the Communications Act of 1934,11 which is the
6. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970). This section
provides in part: "Any hearing subsequently held upon such application should be a full hearing
in which the applicant and all other parties in interest shall be permitted to participate .... "
Plaintiffs further contended that the Policy Statement restricted plaintiffs' first amendment rights
and violated the Adminisrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970), by not holding a public
hearing before issuing the Policy Statement. The court, however, deemed it unnecessary to decide
these 2 issues in light of its holding.
7. The FCC also contended that the Policy Statement was not ripe for review because it was
not a final order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (1970) and 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1970),
and that it established loose guidelines that could be used in "future adjudicatory proceedings."
The court, using the Supreme Court test for ripeness in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136 (1967), dismissed this defense because it found plaintiffs would suffer hardship if the Policy
Statement were not revised and because the issues were proper for judicial review.
8. In holding the Policy Statement invalid, the instant court revised the Commission's order
of July 21, 1970, denying plaintiffs' petition for reconsideration of the Policy Statement and
refusing to institute rule-making proceedings. The Commission was ordered further to "redesignate
all comparative renewal hearings to which the Policy Statement was deemed applicable ... "
447 F.2d at 1214.
9. Ch. 169,44 Stat. 1162, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970).
10. Under the 1927 Federal Radio Act, the regulatory body was the Federal Radio Commis-
sion, the FCC's predecessor.
11. Ch. 652,48 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970).
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basis for most of the present broadcasting controls legislation. Under
this Act, if, after examining each application, the Commission cannot,
for any reason, determine which applicant would best serve the public
interest,' 2 section 309(e) requires that any hearing held thereafter must
be a "full hearing in which the applicant and all other parties in interest
shall be permitted to participate . ." In interpreting this section of
the Act, the Supreme Court, in Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC,4 held
that when there were two or more mutually exclusive applications for
the same license, section 309(e)' 5 guaranteed a full comparative hearing
for all interested parties. 6 Following the Ashbacker decision, the broad-
casting industry, gathering strength in the post-World War II commer-
cial boom, applied pressure on the FCC to promulgate specific criteria
upon which their license applications would be judged. 17 In response, the
FCC, in Hearst Radio, Inc.,"' announced the general rule that, even
though a new applicant was entitled to a full comparative hearing, an
incumbent licensee's past performance was the single most reliable crite-
rion in determining whether to renew its license for another three-year
period. This past performance policy was further clarified in Wabash
Valley Broadcasting Corp., 9 in which the FCC held that a challenging
applicant, seeking to replace the incumbent, must show a superior ability
to serve the public interest. A different policy came to prevail if no
incumbent were involved and, in its 1965 Policy Statement, the FCC
announced that, when awarding a license to one of several new appli-
cants, diversification of control of the media, proposed program service,
and efficiency would be of primary importance." As to past perform-
ance, the 1965 Statement provided that if one of the competing appli-
cants had a previous broadcasting record, this performance would not
12. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1970) (requiring the Commission to examine each application to
determine whether granting a license to an applicant would serve public interest, convenience, and
necessity).
13. 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970). The section becomes operative only after the Commission is
unable to resolve which applicant would best serve the public interest.
14. 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
15. Section 309(e) originally was enacted as 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1934).
16. 326 U.S. 327, 330 (1945).
17. See Comment, The Swinging Pendulum-Conflict of Interest in Renewal of Broadcast
Licenses, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 63 (1970).
18. 15 F.C.C. 1149 (1951).
19. 35 F.C.C. 677 (1963).
20. 1965 Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, I F.C.C.2d 393 (1965). The
Commission listed the following as the principal criteria to which it would look in choosing
licensees: full-time participation in station operation by the owners, proposed program of service,
past broadcast record, efficient use of frequency, and diversification of control of mass media.
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be considered if it were only "within the bounds of average. ' 21 The 1965
Policy Statement, however, explicitly refrained from addressing the
"somewhat different problems raised where an applicant is contesting
with a licensee seeking renewal. ' 2  In considering applicants challenging
incumbents, the Commission continued to follow the Hearst-Wabash
policy until its highly controversial 1969 decision of WHDH, Inc.,2 in
which it deposed an incumbent, holding that if the existing licensee's past
performance were merely average, the licensee would not be entitled to
any preferential treatment. 24 For the first time, a licensee with a faultless
record was not allowed to rely on the almost automatic renewals pre-
viously granted. This unprecedented and wholly unpredicted action by
the FCC precipitated an immediate response by the broadcasting indus-
try. Within the year, more than 50 legislative proposals were being
considered in Congress. 25 Predominant among these proposals was the
Pastore Bill, 2 which proposed to have section 309(e) amended to provide
for a two-stage hearing in which an incumbent's record would be re-
viewed prior to any hearings with challengers. 27 If, when reviewed, the
incumbent's past record were found to have been in the public interest,
the renewal would be granted without hearing any counterproposals by
a challenger. 28 Before this Bill could be voted on, however, the FCC
issued its 1970 Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings In-
volving Regular Renewal Applicants. 29 The Policy Statement retained
the traditional single-hearing approach, but allowed the challenger the
limited role of pointing out the incumbent's shortcomings over the past
three years .3 The Statement further provided that if the incumbent had
a record that reflected substantial service to the community without
"serious deficiencies," it would be granted a renewal regardless of a
21. Id. at 398.
22. But see Seven League Productions, Inc. (WIII), I F.C.C.2d 1597 (1965). Commissioner
Hyde dissented in the 1965 Policy Statement, saying there was no reason why the Statement should
not apply to comparative hearings involving renewals. I F.C.C.2d at 403.
23. 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969), affdsub nom., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d
841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
24. 16 F.C.C.2d at9-10.
25. Comment, The Aftermath of WHDH: Regulation by Competition or Protection of
Mediocrity?, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 368 (1970). See also Comment, The FCC and Broadcasting
License Renewals: Perspectives on WHDH, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 854 (1969).
26. S. 2004, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970).
30. Id. at 425.
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challenger's promise for superior performance.3 1 Moreover, a challenger
would be given a full comparative hearing only if the Commission re-
fused to renew the incumbent's license because of a weak record.3 2 Thus,
the 1970 Policy Statement not only reinstated the essentials of the
Hearst- Wabash policy concerning the incumbent's past performance,3
but it also narrowed the comparative hearing guarantee announced in
Ashbacker.Y Consequently, this preference for the incumbent results in
the inability of minority groups to gain access to broadcasting operation
and ownership.
Before addressing the validity of the 1970 Policy Statement, the
instant court reviewed the FCC's practice of awarding renewal licenses.
Acknowledging that the criteria set forth in the 1965 Policy Statement
were expressly limited to the consideration of new applicants, the court
held that there was nothing in the Communications Act calling for the
preference traditionally given the past performance of an incumbent
licensee. The court further noted that the Act specifically provided that
no automatic preferential rights were to be afforded any renewal appli-
cant.31 The court felt, therefore, that past performance should not be
given any priority unless it had been superior performance. Turning to
the 1970 Policy Statement, the court observed that the Policy Statement
afforded a challenging applicant a full comparative hearing only in those
limited instances when the renewal applicant's past performance was
found to be insubstantial or marred by serious deficiencies. The court
held that this limitation effectively denied a challenger the opportunity
to display his broadcasting plans before the FCC. Consequently, the
court concluded that the 1970 Policy Statement abridged the right to a
full comparative hearing that a challenging applicant for an incumbent's
license is granted under section 309(e) and the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of that section in Ashbacker.3 6
In striking down the FCC's 1970 Policy Statement, the instant
court has taken a significant step toward forcing either the Commission
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Goldin, "Spare the Golden Goose"-The Aftermath of WHDH in FCC License
Renewal Policy. 83 HARV. L. REv. 1014 (1970); Comment, supra note 17.
34. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 304, 307(d), 309(h) (1970). For the court's discussion of this point
see 447 F.2d at 1208-09.
35. The instant decision once again will set the powerful broadcasting industry lobby into
action. Pointing to the WHDH decision and this case, the lobby and its congressional supporters
undoubtedly will propose legislation similar to the Pastore Bill. See text accompanying note 26
supra.
36. 447 F.2d at 1214.
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or Congress into promulgating explicit guidelines to be used in license
renewal proceedings.37 The Policy Statement, while correctly attempting
to "strike a balance" between stability and motivation for improvement
through competition, was too heavily weighted in favor of an incumbent
licensee for it restricted the challenger to pointing out the incumbent's
weaknesses rather than affording him an opportunity to present what
could be a far superior program. Evidence of the stifling effect that the
Policy Statement has had is provided by the fact that there has not been
a single challenger application filed since the issuance of the Statement
over one year ago.38 While the Commission has accurately analyzed the
situation as a balancing problem, the proper weight to be attributed to
the several factors should be reexamined. Theoretically, the need for
security for the industry's investment is weighed against the desire for
healthy competition.3 9 The 1970 Policy Statement evidences the belief
that the proper balance will be struck by granting an automatic renewal
if the incumbent's past performance has been "substantially attuned"
to the public interest. In effect, however, the present policy balances
average with below average past records. Since a poor past performance
usually will require automatic disqualification, the FCC is left with
judging a large number of average performances and a relatively few
excellent ones. The superior licensees should be and are rewarded with
a renewal license; without a competitive hearing, however, it would ap-
pear that an average performer could color his record in such a manner
that it would persuade the Commission to grant a renewal without
hearing from prospective challengers. The subjective balancing act of the
1970 Policy Statement thus enables the average licensee to highlight that
part of its record it believes the Commission would most readily ap-
prove. If this clear invitation for a distorted presentation is coupled with
an abundance of promises for future improvement, there is every reason
to expect the implementation of the Statement to protect most average
licensees and grant them an opportunity to continue for three more
37. Both industry and the public have lobbied for specific guidelines since the inception of
the FCC.
38. 447 F.2dat 1213.
39. The industry's argument for stability is a good one. No company wants to invest millions
of dollars in a broadcasting station that might not have a license in 3 years. The 1970 Policy
Statement, however, does not necessarily secure the superior licensee's position. If the Commission
fails to set specific criteria by which it will judge superior performance, even the superior incumbent
may be subject to the caprice of the FCC. Even worse, with no set of standards, the incumbent




years. In order to avoid this sheltering of mediocrity, the instant court
suggested that only superior performance should be given priority and
that the FCC should specify, qualitatively and quantitatively, what con-
stitutes superior performance. Were the suggestion followed, it would
still protect the investment of a licensee, but only if the station's past
record clearly warranted the protection. Moreover, it would give others
guidelines that they might follow in order to reach the security of a
"superior performance" rating.
Perhaps the most immediate effect the instant decision will have
concerns the campaign by minority groups to bring responsive broad-
casting to their communities.4 Because the 1970 Policy Statement as
promulgated deprived applicants of the opportunity for a full compara-
tive hearing, the incumbent licensee would have been able to ignore the
demands of the community and still stand an excellent chance of having
his license renewed by the Commission. Now, however, challengers can
force the licensee into choosing one of two alternatives. The station can
respond to the community and modify both its broadcasting and hiring
practices," or the station can brace itself for a vigorous challenge from
various pressure groups when its license is next examined pending re-
newal.42 These alternatives should substantially improve the present situ-
ation and promote the Commission's avowed goals of diversification
and decentralization; since only twelve out of 7500 currently licensed
stations are owned and operated by nonwhites, the Commission can
expect that the instant decision will be used by numerous groups at-
tempting to infuse community interests and ownership into the broad-
casting industry.
40. Following the lead of plaintiffs in WHDH, many black and Mexican-American groups
have launched an assault on the broadcasting industry. In California alone, 15 incumbent stations
are facing strong challenges from minority groups, while over 50 stations nationwide are under the
same type of pressure. N.Y. Times. Nov. 8, 1971, at 79, col. I.
41. Id. Recently, 5 Dallas stations hired 50 members of minority groups in order to avoid
facing the community group at a renewal hearing. Id.
42. Id. The leader of the movement to gain a voice in the broadcasting industry is the Office
of Communications of the United Church of Christ in Washington, D.C. Its director, Rev. Everett
L. Parker, has thus far preferred negotiations with incumbents rather than renewal battles. Parker's
example has been followed by Cesar Chavez, noted for his leadership in the Mexican-American
labor movement in California. Mr. Chavez plans to challenge KWAC in Bakersfield, California,
in upcoming renewal hearings. Id. See also NEWSWEEK, Jan. 31, 1972, at 53.
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Constitutional Law-Civil Rights-Granting Absolute
Employment Preference to Minority Applicants over
White Applicants with Superior Qualifications Violates
Equal Protection Clause
Five blacks instituted a class action1 against the Civil Service Com-
mission of Minneapolis 2 alleging discriminatory practices in the recruit-
ment, examination, and hiring procedures of the Minneapolis Fire De-
partment. Accepting the arguments of plaintiffs, the district court found
that the Commission's practices denied them the equal protection of the
law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment and infringed their right
not to be discriminated against in employment by reason of race, which
is guaranteed by section 1981 of title 42 of the United States Code.3
Enjoining defendants temporarily from holding further examinations,
the district court issued a decree creating an absolute preference in fire
department employment for twenty minority persons who met either the
qualifications presently in force4 or the revised qualification standards
established by the decree. 5 On appeal, the Commission contended that
1. The 5 blacks sued on behalf of themselves and all persons similarly situated in the city of
Minneapolis. The classes represented by plaintiff were those black, Indian, and other minority
persons presently applying for employment with the fire department and minority persons who were
not applicants either because their applications were not approved or because they believed that
equal employment would be denied to minority persons.
2. Defendants, who were sued individually and in their official capacity, were members of
the Civil Service Commission of the city, the personnel director of the Commission, and fire chief.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other." Of the
535 men in the fire department, none was black, Indian, or Mexican-American. Only 2 blacks had
served on the fire department in the recent past. Blacks constituted 6.44% of the Minneapolis
population in 1970.
4. Although the examinations were found to be discriminatory, they were standard, job-
related tests. At the time of trial, defendants, who only recently had been appointed to the Civil
Service Commission, had discussed their rules and examinations with interested parties and civic
groups, and had made changes in the Commission rules, in order to eliminate racial discrimination.
They also had agreed to employ competent experts to validate future examinations and to take steps
to promote recruitment of minority persons.
5. The court also directed defendants: (1) to establish an eligibility list of all minority appli-
cants for the position of fireman who qualified under either the present examination plan or under
an amended plan decreed by the court; (2) to refrain from holding examinations for white applicants
until the discriminatory hiring practices were corrected and 20 minority persons employed; and (3)
to submit to the court for approval an affirmative plan for recruitment of minority persons. The
court was to maintain jurisdiction until it was reasonably assured that racial discrimination had
been eliminated in filling positions in the department.
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the minority preference violated the fourteenth amendment because it
discriminated against white applicants who had qualifications superior
to those of the minority applicants. Agreeing with the Commission, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, held, reversed
and vacated the preferential order. A grant of absolute preference in
governmental employment to qualified minority applicants over white
applicants with superior qualifications discriminates against whites in
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and
section 1981 of title 42 of the United States Code. Carter v. Gallagher,
452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971).
The purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to eliminate racial
classifications, 7 and to prevent groups and individuals from being stig-
matized by government.8 Section 1981 of title 42 of the United States
Code complements that purpose by guaranteeing to all persons the same
rights and protections regardless of race? Although classifications based
on race are not per se unconstitutional, they are said to be "suspect"
and their constitutionality requires more than a showing of a mere ra-
tional relationship between the classification and a legitimate purpose. 0
The general rule is that they not only must be reasonably drawn for the
purpose for which they were established, but that they also must be
supported by an overriding or compelling state interest." The determina-
tion of a compelling state interest involves a judicial balancing of the
benefits emanating from the state's objectives against the detriments
resulting from infringement of a basic personal right. 12 Since the classifi-
cations that generally have been the subject of constitutional challenge
6. The court reversed only the minority preference and the provisions that implemented the
preference.
7. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 188 (1965) (statute that prohibits an
unmarried interracial couple from living in the same room violates the equal protection clause).
See also Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 584 (1882) (statute that prohibits white and Negro from
living together not in conflict with fourteenth amendment).
8. Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society-Judicial Activism or
Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 18 (1968). See also Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401,492-508
(D.D.C. 1967); O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to
Higher Education, 80 YALE L.J. 699, 713 (1971).
9. The Supreme Court has recognized that § 1981 and the fourteenth amendment are related
in purpose and meaning. See, e.g., Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
10. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1088 (1969).
11. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). Although McLaughlin is concerned primar-
ily with classifications in a criminal miscegenation statute, the Court considered the broad implica-
tions of the constitutionality of racial classifications.
12. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 10, at 1132.
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are those which discriminate against a minority group, a somewhat
unique problem has been created by discriminatory classifications of
majority groups intended to ameliorate past racial inequities. Although
the classification in these instances may be racial and therefore "sus-
pect," the Supreme Court has recognized a compelling public interest
in overcoming discriminatory practices and has held that equity courts
have the duty to eliminate present effects of past discrimination. 3 Ac-
cordingly, lower courts have upheld racial classification in the form of
preferences designed to achieve equality in the areas of school segrega-
tion" and housing. 5 Similarly, in the field of employment, a minority
preference to correct past discriminatory promotion practices has been
judicially approved as a remedy for qualified minority employees in a
departmental transfer, even though existing seniority arrangements were
nondiscriminatory." Preference also has been used by courts in order to
promote black teachers to positions as principals, and bypassing white
teachers due for promotion.' 7 More recently, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of minor-
ity manpower utilization goals as an appropriate remedy for discrimina-
tory hiring policies despite the plaintiff's argument that an employer's
decision to hire a black person necessarily involves a decision not to hire
a qualified white employee.' 8 Some remedial racial classifications how-
ever, have come under attack as promoting unconstitutional reverse
discrimination against whites. At least one court, on its own initiative,
has struck down racial classifications in school preferential admissions
on the premise that the Constitution is color blind and requires nondis-
criminatory treatment toward all groups. The Supreme Court has
13. See, e.g., Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (equity courts have the duty
to eradicate the evil effects of discriminatory practices).
14. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educ., 431 F.2d 138 (1970), affd, 402
U.S. 1 (1971) (busing and assignment to schools on racial basis to achieve integrated school system
are constitutional); Offermann v. Notkowski, 378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1967) (school district boundaries
based on race do not violate the constitutional rights of whites).
15. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968) (regu-
lation granting housing preference to persons displaced by urban renewal is constitutional).
16. Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968) (although reverse
discrimination is not required under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, minority persons should not be
frozen in job opportunities because of past discriminatory practices).
17. Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971) (state
action based in part on considerations of color and in furtherance of a proper governmental
objective is not necessarily a violation of the equal protection clause).
18. Contractor's Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971). The case was
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and upheld the constitutionality of the
revised "Philadelphia Plan" for contractors.
19. DeFunis v. University of Washington, No. 741727 (Wash. Super. Ct., Sept. 22, 1971).
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never addressed the constitutional issue of reverse discrimination, but,
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,2 it held that Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 196421 did not command that a person be hired simply because
he was a member of a minority group which previously had been dis-
criminated against; discriminatory preference for any group, either ma-
jority or minority, was proscribed.
In the instant case, the court read section 1981 and the fourteenth
amendment to proscribe any racial discrimination in employment
whether the discrimination be against whites or blacks. Recognizing that
defendants had taken affirmative action to remedy discriminatory hiring
practices, and stating that an applicant who scored higher on a fairly
conducted civil service examination had a right to preference over appli-
cants with lower scores,22 the court found that granting an absolute
preference to minority persons regardless of their respective scores would
discriminate against white applicants who scored higher than the minor-
ity applicants.2 The court distinguished the school integration cases 24 on
the ground that whites have no constitutional right to insist upon segre-
gated schools while all persons have a right to employment free from
discrimination. Since there was no proof that any specific plaintiff had
been discriminated against, the court also distinguished those cases in
which specific identified persons were able to prove that they had been
discriminated against. 25 Relying on Griggs26 to support its viewpoint, the
court concluded that past discrimination against minorities was no justi-
fication for discrimination against the majority in the present 27 and that
an absolute employment preference to minority applicants therefore vio-
lated the equal protection clause and section 1981.
The instant decision is one of the first to uphold an asserted defense
20. 401 U.S.424(1971).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -15 (1970).
22. The court found that the Home Rule charter of Minneapolis and civil service provisions
of Minneapolis accorded preference to the fireman-applicant with the highest test score.
23. The Eighth Circuit found that the lower court's equity power afforded no basis for
depriving others of constitutionally protected rights. The court stated that plaintiffs had conceded
this in their brief when plaintiffs assumed that the lower court could not order the city to take any
unconstitutional action.
24. See cases cited note 14 supra.
25. See, e.g., Heat Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) (plaintiffs
denied membership in union with no Negro or Mexican-American members ordered admitted by
court).
26. 401 U.S.424 (1971).
27. The court reasoned that the fact that because of racial discrimination some unknown
white person may have received preference over some unidentified minority person with higher
qualifications was no justification for discriminating against a better qualified white applicant now.
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of reverse discrimination. In considering whether a minority preference
violates the constitutional rights of others, the court confronted a di-
lemma not heretofore resolved. On the one hand, there is the question
whether minorities should be given preferences to compensate for past
injustices. On the other hand, there is the question whether the court
should proscribe all discrimination, including reverse discrimination cre-
ated through preferential treatment. Those who advocate minority pref-
erences have accepted as a basic premise that, when inequalities exist,
justice demands that preference be given immediately to correct the
imbalance. 28 Arguing that the majority enjoys benefits of past inequali-
ties, those favoring minority preferences further contend that preferences
aid the minority in their integration into society thereby correcting ine-
qualities. These advocates argue that the utilitarian considerations, such
as the cost to educate the minority and the divisive resentment caused
in the majority by the preference, should yield to the upgrading of the
minority's unequal economic status and the abolishment of the disres-
pect caused by that status. 29 The opponents of minority preference prem-
ise their argument on the idea that preference tends to undermine the
principle of increasing the individual's worth, which is the goal behind
the preferential treatment. Their argument is that a minority group's
motivation, which may have existed before they received the preference,
will be dampened because they will rely on preferential treatment as a
right, and that after receiving the preference their feeling of accomplish-
ment will be clouded becaue they will not know to what extent their
achievement was based on merit." In addition, they urge that the arbi-
trary selection of individual members of a minority for preferential treat-
ment not only discriminates against majority groups, but also against
those of the minority who are not given preference. In attempting to
evade the horns of this dilemma, the instant court compromised both
arguments by refusing to allow discriminatory minority preference while
at the same time requiring the city to revise the qualification examina-
tion and eligibility list to insure the inclusion of minority persons in the
fire department. The instant court supports this compromise position by
the Griggs3t interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
28. E.g., Hughes, Reparations for Blacks?, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1063, 1067 (1968). See also
Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 164, 165 (1968).
29. E.g., Hughes, Reparations for Blacks?, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1063, 1064 (1968).
30. Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of
Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. Rev. 363, 378 (1966).
31. "In short, the Act does not command that any person be hired simply because he was
formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group. Discrimina-
tory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has
proscribed." 401 U.S. at 430-3 1.
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Although Griggs is not controlling in the instant case, it is noteworthy
that the Supreme Court has construed congressional intent to mean that
less qualified persons should not be preferred over the better qualified
solely because of minority origins. If this is the intent of Congress, the
instant decision is justifiable when applied to employment decisions,
especially decisions that rely on job-related tests involving the hiring of
nonmanagement personnel. It is doubtful, however, whether the instant
decision is applicable to other areas of the law, such as college preferen-
tial admissions, which involve decisions that are more discretionary.
While preferences related to these discretionary decisions probably
would have to meet the general rule of reasonableness and be related to
a compelling state interest, the instant court failed to discuss the reason-
ableness of this preference or any state interest that might be served by
minority preference. This failure to consider the possible appropriateness
of minority preferences seems to thwart previous progress in overcoming
discrimination. In addition, the instant court's requirement that specific
acts of discrimination must violate identifiable constitutional rights of
each individual member of the class before a class action is appropriate
significantly lessens the availability of a class action as a remedy to
discrimination. Regardless of these negative implications of the decision,
the instant court's compromise result does not undo all the progress
made, because, while it did refuse to allow a discriminatory minority
preference, it also required the city to take specific affirmative action to
include minority persons in the fire department.3 1
32. Since the preparation of this Comment, the Eighth Circuit has modified the instant
decision. On rehearing, the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its holding that an absolute preference violates
the constitutional right of equal protection to white persons who are equally or better qualified.
The court did set up a temporary ratio hiring procedure, however, as a remedy for the past
discrimination. The ratio requires one out of every 3 persons hired by the fire department to be a
qualified, minority person until at least 20 minority persons have been hired. The dissenting
opinion, while acknowledging that the ratio will not discriminate against as many whites as an
absolute preference, argued that the ratio procedure was nevertheless subject to the same constitu-
tional infirmity. Carter v. Gallagher, No. 71-1181 (8th Cir., Jan. 2, 1972).
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Constitutional Law-Right of Privacy -Retention of
Arrest Records After Acquittal Violates Right of Privacy
Petitioner, acquitted of charges for assault, sought a writ of man-
date ordering the chief of police to show cause why the fingerprints and
photographs contained in the police records' of her arrest should not be
returned to her. Petitioner contended that the refusal to return her finger-
prints and photographs, in the absence of justification for their retention,
violated her right of privacy. Respondent, on the other hand, argued that
since the statute2 contained no provision for the return of arrest records,
the police had implied statutory authority to retain them.3 The trial court
refused to issue the writ.4 On appeal to the Washington Court of Ap-
peals, held, reversed. Without a showing of compelling necessity by the
state, the retention of fingerprints and photographs of a person who has
been acquited of criminal charges and who has an otherwise unblemished
criminal record violates that person's constitutional right of privacy.5
Eddy v. Moore, 487 P.2d 211 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
Long before the Supreme Court originally discerned a constitution-
ally grounded right of privacy, virtually all courts recognized an equita-
ble right of privacy.' Although the equitable right of privacy protected
the individual from unreasonable intrusion into his private affairs and
from unreasonable publicity of private facts that could embarass or
falsely represent him in the public eye, 7 the courts almost uniformly have
refused to extend lhat right to a case in which a person acquitted of
criminal charges seeks expunction of his criminal arrest records., In
refusing expunction the courts have reasoned that the police, by virtue
1. Washington, like most states, requires the filing of arrest records, including fingerprints
and photographs, on all persons arrested for felonies or serious misdemeanors, and provides for
the dissemination of these records through cooperative exchange with other state and federal law
enforcement agencies. There is no provision for the return or expunction of these records. WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 72.50.010-.110 (1962).
2. Id.
3. Eddy v. Moore, 487 P.2d 211,212 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
4. Id. at 211.
5. Since the Seattle Police Department showed no further justification for the retention of
petitioner's arrest records, the court ordered their return.
6. E.g., Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931) (movie based on defendant's
earlier life as a prostitute).
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967); Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1960); Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L.
REv. 1093 (1962).
8. See, e.g., Hershel v. Dyra, 365 F.2d 17 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 973 (1966); Shaffer
v. United States, 24 App. D.C. 417 (Ct. App. 1904), cert. denied, 196 U.S. 639 (1905).
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of their obligation to protect society, have an interest in the retention of
fingerprints, photographs, and other arrest information for investigative
purposes and that this interest overrides a mere equitable prohibition
against intrusion upon personal rights.9 An exception to the general rule
denying expunction has been recognized, however, when records ob-
tained through an illegal arrest are retained by the state. The view taken
by the courts is that this action is nonjudicial punishment which violates
due process as well as the equitable right of privacy.10 The display of an
acquitted individual's photograph in a rogue's gallery also has been held
by some courts to exceed the police privilege of retaining arrest records.,'
These courts have reasoned that the risk of undeserved infamy arising
from the exhibition of an acquitted person's photograph among those
of convicted criminals is a particularly offensive abuse of the right to
retain records, especially when the form of retention is not justified as
an investigative tool.1 2 Although the equitable right of privacy generally
has proved to be an ineffective basis for compelling the expunction of
arrest records, the Supreme Court, in Griswold v. Connecticut," recently
has acknowledged the existence of zones of individual privacy that ema-
nate from the penumbrae of express constitutional guarantees found in
the Bill of Rights. 4 Although declining to outline specifically the bound-
aries of these peripheral zones, the Court held that for government en-
croachment upon these fundamental liberties to be permitted, it must be
accompanied by compelling and necessary state interests, 15 a require-
ment not present in the equitable right of privacy. United States v.
Kalish" was the first case to examine the right to the return of arrest
9. See cases cited note 8 supra. One court described it as "a humiliation to which [the
individual] must submit for the benefit of society." Fernicola v. Keenan, 136 N.J. Eq. 9, 10, 39
A.2d 851 (Ch. 1944).
10. United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967) (arrests of Negroes for purpose
of interfering with voting rights); Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (arrests of
"hippies" for purpose of harassment); see Note, Constitutional Law-Right of Police To Retain
Arrest Records, 49 N.C.L. REv. 509, 510-11 (1971).
11. ltzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905); Downs v. Swann, 111 Md. 53,
73 A. 653 (1909).
12. Note I I supra and accompanying text; see Prosser, supra note 7, at 399-400.
13. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14. Id. at 484. The independent right to personal privacy arises from the first amendment
right of association, the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure, and
the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination. The ninth amendment added support to
these "other rights" retained by the people. Id. For further explanation of the Court's rationale
and the impact of the Griswold decision see Symposium-Comments on the Griswold case, 64
MICH. L. REV. 197 (1965); 18 VAND. L. REV. 2037 (1965).
15. 381 U.S. at485.
16. 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967). Kalish, arrested for refusing to submit to induction,
contended that his refusal was based on advice of counsel in appealing his selective service classifica-
tion. Soon after dismissal of the charges, he voluntarily entered the armed services.
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records under the Griswold rationale. In ordering the expunction of the
records from police files, the court reasoned that even though there is
no constitutional right of privacy outweighing the societal interest in
compiling fingerprints, photographs, and other data at the time of ar-
rest, these records no longer serve a public interest when the accused has
been acquitted or discharged without conviction.' 7 Instead, the retention
of the arrest record sullies his personal dignity and violates his right of
privacy 8 by attaching to his public record an unwarranted stigma of
criminality. 9 Similarly, in Menard v. Mitchell,21 the court examined in
detail the detrimental effects of an arrest record and noted that even
when followed by exoneration from the charges, an arrest record can
result in the loss of educational and employment opportunities,2' or can
adversely affect the disposition of subsequent criminal charges against
an individual. 2 Although the case was remanded for insufficient facts,
the court emphasized the need for safeguards against improper dissemi-
nation of arrest records,2 and indicated that when the accused had been
wholly cleared of the charges against him, the mere existence of an arrest
record might be constitutionally invalid. 24
Confronting the issue whether the constitutional right of privacy,
as developed in Griswold, forbids unwarranted retention of an acquitted
person's fingerprints and photographs, the instant court initially ob-
served that a loss of privacy necessarily accompanies the accumulation
17. Id. at 970.
18. The court's opinion did not clarify whether the basis for this right of privacy was constitu-
tional or equitable. The extremity of the factual situation, as well as the brevity of the opinion,
indicate that the court intended equitable grounds for their decision.
19. 271 F. Supp. at 970.
20. 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Plaintiff, arrested in California for suspicion of burglary,
was discharged for lack of evidence connecting him with the crime. An arrest record was filed,
however, and a copy transferred to the FBI iles in accordance with California law. Plaintiff sought
expunction of the FBI record, contending that his arrest had been made without probable cause
and that the arrest record was not a "criminal record" within the scope of the statute authorizing
FBI retention. See Note, supra note 10; 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 825 (1971).
21. 430 F.2d at 490. For example, 75% of the New York area employment agencies will not
recommend a person with an arrest record. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 75 (1967); see Hess &
Le Poole, Abuse of the Record of Arrest Not Leading to Conviction, 13 CRIME & DELIN. 494 (1967).
22. 430 F.2d at 491; see Russell v. United States, 402 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (determina-
tion of bail or pretrial release); W. LAFAVE, ARREST 287-89 (1965).
23. "IT]here is a limit beyond which the government may not tread in devising classifications
that lump the innocent with the guilty." 430 F.2d at 492.
24. Id. The court stated that an arrest without probable cause was especially susceptible to
constitutional attack. On remand, the district court refused to acknowledge jurisdiction on the issue
of probable cause, but did enjoin the FBI from dissemination of Menard's arrest record to nongov-
ernmental agencies. Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971).
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of an arrest record. It noted further that the resultant notoriety can be
injurious to personal reputation and give rise to an increased susceptibil-
ity to police scrutiny.? Thus the court found that the unwarranted reten-
tion of police records offends an inherent constitutional right of privacy,
and concluded that the state must show a compelling necessity for the
continuation of this practice.2 6 In that same vein, it conceded that the
state could provide the justification by establishing that the retention of
all arrested persons' fingerprints and photographs is critical to effective
law enforcement and societal protection. The court noted, however, that
since this justification rests upon the assumptions that the person ac-
tually committed the crime and that commission of the crime indicates
a risk of future criminal activity, an acquittal, which appears to negate
both premises, belies the need for retention of the arrest record. Accord-
ingly, it held that in the absence of compelling justification by the
State,27 an individual acquitted of charges against him has a constitu-
tional right to the return of his fingerprints and photographs from police
files.
By extending the Griswold doctrine to an acquitted person's finger-
prints and photographs, the instant court has provided long-needed safe-
guards against the deleterious effects of retaining those records-the
increased visibility to police, the risk of damage to reputation, and the
ensuing loss of job opportunities and other societal benefits. Conversely
stated, since retention of an arrest record is only justified when the
record is necessary to efficient law enforcement, which in turn depends
upon whether the person is guilty, the police implicitly are authorized
to retain only those arrest records that are followed by conviction or for
which the police can demonstrate extrinsic compelling need. One admin-
istrative problem generated by this ruling is whether the police must now
take affirmative action to expunge from their files all past records that
cannot be justified under the instant decision, or instead, whether ex-
punction is contingent upon the individual's request. The instant court's
rationale indicates that removal of all unauthorized records is required
without request of the individual. Moreover, the court intimates that
unless the state can establish compelling justification, any nonconviction
disposition of criminal charges against an individual will require auto-
25. The court, citing Kalish, emphasized the heightened visibility to both the public and police
created by identification as a criminal suspect.
26. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
27. Although the court did not specify what further justification would be sufficient, the
opinion implies a need to rebut the presumption of innocence accorded an acquittal or discharge
without conviction.
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matic expunction of his arrest records. Under such a mandate the state
is obviously burdened with the problem of determining what external
justification will warrant retention of arrest records not followed by
conviction. Must the police, for example, forego investigative files on
persons who, although repeatedly arrested, escape conviction on proce-
dural grounds? A viable solution to this problem, which is analogous to
the procedure for obtaining a search warrant, may be to give the state
the opportunity to request an independent judicial ruling in those situa-
tions in which the failure to obtain a conviction does not necessarily
establish an absence of guilt.28 Such a method, although initially cum-
bersome, would provide objective determinations on a case-by-case basis
and eventually would establish more facile judicial guidelines.29 Even
legitimately retained records, including the arrest records of convicted
criminals, might not fully escape the requirements of the instant case,
however, because the right of privacy may demand some control over
the dissemination of records properly in police custody. Public prejudice
against the ex-convict greatly impedes his search for social acceptance,
employment, and a return to normal life, and may even result in recidiv-
ism. 30 Certainly there are some institutions, including many individual
employers, with valid reasons to examine a person's criminal history,
but it may be that the individual's right of privacy and the overall need
to achieve social tolerance will restrict the uncontrolled dissemination of
even legitimate arrest records. Special benefit could be derived by the
juvenile offender who, although often arrested for less serious or even
noncriminal actions, is particularly sensitive to the stigma of delin-
quency and must suffer its effects throughout his adulthood.3 ' In addi-
tion to the retention and dissemination of criminal records, the instant
case may affect the accumulation of government dossiers on political
dissidents, which are not specifically "criminal" in nature, but which do
pose ominous threats to an individual's privacy. These dossiers, com-
piled under the auspices of national security, encroach not only upon the
right of privacy but also the freedoms of speech and assembly guaran-
28. Note, supra note 10, at 518-19.
29. Id.
30. See Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND.
L. REV. 929 (1970).
31. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
supra note 21, at 38-40. A few states have instituted procedures by which a youth arrested or
convicted of a juvenile offense may, after a period of time, petition for the expunction or sealing of
all records retained by the police or court pertaining to his arrest or its disposition. See CAL. WELF.
& INST'NS CODE § 781(a) (Supp. 1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-117 (Supp. 1971).
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teed by the first amendment. 32 Since these persons threaten no criminal
activity in the ordinary sense, and since government dossiers imply a
twofold violation of the Constitution, the courts should require an even
stronger showing of compelling governmental justification as a condi-
tion to their retention.
Amidst a technological naissance, in which computer-based data
centers can process and disgorge information almost instantaneously,
both governmental and private institutions have begun extensive pro-
grams for the compilation and centralization of personal data. 33 The
rapid expansion of private credit-reporting services34 and the growing
support for a National Data Center, 35 which would centralize the infor-
mation of all the various government agencies, illustrate the growth of
technology in this area and its popularity. These developments, however,
are necessarily accompanied by the danger of misuse, because the com-
puter with its calculated objectivity is susceptible to unauthorized exami-
nation and misinterpretation of its information.36 The instant case, in
recognizing constitutional safeguards against the accumulation and dis-
semination of certain personal data, may limit the extent to which these
data banks can store and use personal information and may provide
reasonable controls to ensure that authorized reporting will be done
accurately. Unfortunately, the collection of personal information, espe-
cially by private institutions, is not easily controlled. Even a constitu-
tional right to have this data secreted may prove inadequate due to
difficulties in discovering unauthorized invasions of privacy and in prov-
ing actual damages that result from the invasion. 37 In addition, economic
pressures imposed by many employers and the incentive to obtain a good
credit-rating may force individuals to waive their right of privacy and
volunteer confidential information .3 An obvious and perhaps necessary
32. See Askin, Police Dossiers and Emerging Principles of First Amendment Adjudication,
22 STAN. L. REv. 196 (1970).
33. Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in
an Information-OrientedSociety, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1103 (1969).
34. For a discussion of private services see V. PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY (1964); A.
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967).
35. See Note, Privacy and Efficient Government: Proposals for a National Data Center, 82
HARV. L. REV. 400 (1968). A recent proposed model for the National Data Center is described in
HEARINGS ON COMPUTER PRIVACY BEFORE THE SCBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
36. Miller, supra note 33, at 1109.
37. Karst, "The Files": Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored
Personal Data, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 342, 350 (1966).
38. Id. at 345; Michael, Speculations on the Relation of the Computer to Individual Freedom
and the Right to Privacy, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 270,275 (1964).
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alternative is for the legislature to introduce comprehensive controls
upon the accumulation and use of personal data. Congress, far more
than the courts, is equipped with the research tools to provide an exten-
sive series of safeguards throughout the area of personal data processing.
The instant case may provide a springboard for legal developments, both
judicial and legislative, that will determine whether our evolution toward
a "dossier society" will upend the balance between an individual's right
to privacy and the public's need for protection.
Criminal Law-Jury Instructions-ABA Jury Instruc-
tion Adopted As Preferable to Allen Charge
Appellant was convicted in federal district court on counts of rob-
bery and assault with a deadly weapon.' At the conclusion of the evid-
ence, the trial judge delivered to the jury a version of the Allen charge,
2
which includes a reference to the duty of a dissenting juror to consider
whether his position is reasonable in light of the conclusions drawn by
the majority.3 Following an apparent deadlock by the jury, 4 the judge,
in a supplementary instruction, told the jury that he was not going to
declare a mistrial, reminded them of the "substantial backlog of work"
facing the court, and instructed them to reconvene and try to reach a
1. The indictment alleged that appellant was one of 2 men who broke into the victim's
apartment and held him at gunpoint while they ransacked his apartment. At issue in the trial court
was the identity of appellant as one of the assailants.
2. The charge, taken from the 1851 Massachusetts decision of Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62
Mass. (8 Cush.) 1 (1851), was sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S.
492 (1896). It is also known as the "dynamite charge," the "third-degree instruction," and the
"shotgun instruction."
3. The trial judge included the following as part of his instruction: "In a large portion of
the cases absolute certainty cannot be expected, although the verdict must be the verdict of each
individual juror and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of your fellow jurors, yet you should
examine the question submitted with candor and proper regard and deference for the opinion of
each other. It is your duty to decide the case if you can conscientiously do so. You should listen to
each other's argument with a disposition to be convinced. If much the larger number of jurors are
for conviction, a dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt is a reasonable one which makes
no impression upon the minds of so many jurors equally honest, equally intelligent with himself.
"If on the other hand the majority are for acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves
whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which is not concurred in
by the majority." United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The significant
portion of this instruction taken from Allen is the direction of the minority dissenting jurors to
review their conclusions irL light of those of the majority.
4. After the jury had deliberated for about an hour, they sent a note to the judge advising
him that they were unable to reach an agreement. The jury was returned to the courtroom.
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decision.5 After further deliberation, the jury returned a verdict finding
appellant guilty on both counts of the indictment. Appellant maintained
that the trial judge's use of the Allen charge and the supplementary
instruction constituted coercion of the jury and improperly induced the
verdict. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, held, reversed. When the Allen charge is supplemented by
further encouragement for the jury to reach a decision, a substantial
probability of prejudice to the accused is created; moreover future rendi-
tions of the Allen-type charge should adhere to the guidelines established
by the ABA Standards for Trial by Jury. United States v. Thomas, 449
F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
In a day of crowded dockets and rising legal costs, the expense of
a mistrial often has prompted a judge to attempt to avoid a hung jury,
by encouraging the unanimous agreement of a deadlocked panel. The
authority of a judge, however, to influence the deliberation process has
been carefully circumscribed to prevent coercion or unwarranted intru-
sions into the province of the jury,7 but the line between proper guidance
and coercion remains a fine one. In the 1896 decision of Allen v. United
States," the Supreme Court sanctioned a charge generally considered to
be the outer limit of a judge's prerogative to urge a unanimous verdict.'
The approved instruction directed that while a dissenting juror should
5. In the supplementary instruction the judge made the following comments to the jury: "I
am not going to declare a mistrial, and thereby require a retrial of this case before some other
jury ...
"I am sure you ladies and gentlemen know we have a substantial backlog of work, and to
spend another day before another jury retrying this case just doesn't make sense to me. See if you
can't decide and come to a verdict, think about it overnight individually." 449 F.2d at 1180 n.1 I.
The judge then excused the jury for the night.
6. Over 5% of all jury trials result in a hung jury. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN
JURY 453 (1966).
7. See, e.g., Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy and the Hung Jury: A Reexamination of
the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REV. 123 (1967).
8. 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
9. The approved instruction was stated by the Allen court: "[Tihat in a large proportion of
cases absolute certainty could not be expected; that although the verdict must be the verdict of each
individual juror, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they should
examine the question submitted with candor and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions
of each other; that it was their duty to decide the case if they could conscientiously do so; that they
should listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's arguments; that, if much the larger
number were for conviction, a dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable
one which made no impression upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent
with himself. If, upon the other hand, the majority was for acquittal, the minority ought to ask
themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not
concurred in by the majority." 164 U.S. at 501.
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by no means merely acquiesce in the conclusion of his fellows, he never-
theless should consider whether his opinion was reasonable in light of
the decision reached by the majority. Since its approval by the Supreme
Court, however, the Allen charge has become the subject of a great deal
of criticism, both for the substantive issues it raised and for the adminis-
trative difficulties it created."0 The substantive objections focus primarily
upon the direction of a minority juror to "consider whether his doubt
[is] a reasonable one which [makes] no impression upon the minds of
so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself."" By
directing reevaluation only of the minority point of view, it has been
argued that the charge interjects the prestige of the court on behalf of
the majority position and thereby creates a risk of dislodging individual
jurors from conscientiously held beliefs.' 2 Although this objection has
never persuaded a court to find a properly framed Allen charge unconsti-
tutional, 13 it has elicited the holding that an unwarranted addition to the
basic Allen charge renders it coercive.' 4 Similarly, failure to include in
the charge language emphasizing a juror's right to retain his conscien-
10. See United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969)
(modifying the Allen charge in that circuit); Jenkins v. United States, 330 F.2d 220, 221 (D.C. Cir.
1964) (Wright, J., dissenting), rev'd, 380 U.S. 445 (1965); Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127,
129 (5th Cir. 1962) (Wisdom, J., dissenting); Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 756 (5th
Cir. 1962) (Brown, J., dissenting); Comment, Defusing the Dynamite Charge: A Critique of Allen
and Its Progeny, 36 TENN. L. REv. 749 (1969); Note, Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite: A Critical
Look at the "Allen Charge," 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 386 (1964); Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy
and the Hung Jury: A Reexamination of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. Rav. 123 (1967); Note, On
Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 78 YALE L.J. 100 (1968).
11. 164U.S.at501.
12. Claims of such coercive influence usually are based upon one of 2 grounds: first, language
is often added to or left out of the charge, distorting the thrust of the approved wording; secondly,
the argument is made that the charge, even if properly worded, is coercive per se. Note, Deadlocked
Juries and Dynamite: A Criticial Look at the "Allen Charge," supra note 10.
13. The charge sanctioned in Allen has been upheld by the Supreme Court in subsequent
decisions. Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952); Lias v. United States, 284 U.S. 584
(1931). The D.C. Circuit also has voiced approval of the charge. Post v. United States, 407 F.2d
319, 320 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1092 (1969); Fulwood v. United States, 369
F.2d 960 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 934 (1967). This court has warned, however, that
the Allen charge approaches the limit to which a court should go in suggesting to jurors the
desirability of agreement and avoidance of the necessity of a retrial before another jury. Williams
v. United States, 338 F.2d 530, 533 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
14. See, e.g., Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446 (1965) ("you have got to reach a
decision in this case"); United States v. Smith, 399 F.2d 896, 898 (6th Cir. 1968) ("it is my opinion
that this defendant has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt"); United States v. Harris,
391 F.2d 348, 355 (6th Cir. 1968) ("this lawsuit must be decided-it must be decided at some time
by some jury"); Powell v. United States, 297 F.2d 318, 320 (5th Cir. 1961) ("it is no credit for a
juror to stand out in a pure spirit of stubbornness").
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tiously held minority viewpoint has been a ground for reversal.15 The
administrative objection to the Allen charge is that it generates a large
number of appeals based on claims that the charge and its many varia-
tions have exceeded the limits of proper guidance. 6 This argument has
led the Third and Seventh Circuits to ban the use of the Allen charge.17
In an effort to alleviate these problems created by Allen, the American
Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice
developed a jury instruction designed to fulfill the desirable purpose of
the Allen charge while eliminating some of its potentially coercive lan-
guage.'1 The ABA charge encourages each juror to reexamine his own
views in light of the opinions held by the other jurors, but abandons all
reference to majority-minority divisions, thus reducing the likelihood
that the court's influence will improperly support the majority and un-
dermine the minority. 9 Following the ABA suggestion, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia expressed approval of the ABA
charge in United States v. Johnson.2 Among those courts who have
15. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1961).
16. This objection has led the supreme courts of Montana and Arizona to abandon further
use of the Allen charge. State v. Randall, 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d 1054 (1960); State v. Thomas,
86 Ariz. 161, 342 P.2d 197 (1959). The Thomas court explained: "When and wherever its use is
called into question it must stand or fall upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
It has given, and we believe each use will give us, harassment and distress in the administration of
justice. No rule of thumb can circumscribe definite bounds of when and where, or under what
circumstances it should be given or refused." Id. at 166, 342 P.2d at 200.
17. United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970);
United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1969). The Fioravanti court recommended the
substitution of a charge approved in W. MATHES & E. DEvITT, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONS § 79.01 (1965). 412 F.2d at 420 n.32.
18. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY 145-46 (1968):
"5.4 Length of Deliberations; deadlocked jury.
"(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may give an instruction which informs
the jury: (i) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto; (ii) that jurors
have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement,
if it can be done without violence to individual judgment; (iii) that each juror must decide the
case for himself, but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with his fellow
jurors; (iv) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to reexamine his
own views and change his opinion if convinced it is erroneous; and (v) that no juror should
surrender his honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the
opinion of his fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
"(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to agree, the court may require
the jury to continue their deliberations and may give or repeat an instruction as provided in
subsection (a). The court shall not require or threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an
unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals.
"(c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a verdict if it appears there is
no reasonable probability of agreement."
19. Id.
20. 432 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
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criticized the Allen charge, however, only one court 1 has expressly
adopted the ABA instruction in lieu of the Allen charge.
The instant court, acknowledging the narrow distinction between
guidance and coercion, outlined three types of instructions that have
been held to impose improper duress on a deadlocked jury: statements
reflecting the judge's assessment that the factual issues bear relatively
easy solution; expressions overly emphasizing the desirability of achiev-
ing a verdict as a means of avoiding the necessity of a retrial; and
statements susceptible to an interpretation reflecting unwholesomely
upon minority jurors simply because they happen to be in the minority.
The court held that the proper test to measure the propriety of an
instruction was whether the communication from the judge possessed "a
substantial propensity for prying individual jurors loose from beliefs
they honestly have." 2 The court further noted that, although the Allen
charge was not coercive per se, it could become so if supplemented by
additional encouragement to minority jurors to consider the findings of
the majority. After reviewing the instant facts, the court concluded that
the additional statements of the trial judge created a substantial proba-
bility of prejudice to the accused. Having thus given the grounds upon
which the instant conviction should be reversed, the court turned to a
consideration of the utility of the Allen charge and the expenditure of
judicial time and energy it required. The court pointed out the drain on
appellate resources caused by recurring Allen charge appeals and noted
that it previously had approved the ABA standard jury charge in
Johnson. Exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, 24 the court concluded
that, in the interest of efficient judicial administration, future renditions
of the Allen-type instruction would be required to adhere to the guide-
lines of the ABA standard.?-
The purpose of employing the Allen charge is to avoid unnecessarily
deadlocked juries by encouraging any stubborn juror to consider the
21. United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 1969).
22. 449 F.2d at 1182.
23. 432 F.2d at 633.
24. The court in the instant case was sitting en banc, giving it jurisdiction, not present in the
Johnson case, to issue a supervisory opinion binding upon the district courts within the circuit.
25. Circuit Judge Robb, joined by 3 other judges, dissented vigorously both to the finding of
improper coercion and to the supervisory ban of the Allen charge. The dissent contended that the
instructions of the trial judge, when read in context, showed no probability of coercive impact upon
any juror. The dissent also disapproved of the adoption of the ABA charge, pointing out that it
also may be rendered coercive by additions or deletions by the trial judge, and referred to the charge
as "an invitation to a stubborn or recalcitrant juror to persist in a blind adherence to his position,
thereby producing a hung jury." 449 F.2d at 1188, 1192 (Robb, J., dissenting).
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reasoning of other members before reaching his conclusion. To be bal-
anced against this legitimate objective is the right of the parties to have
each juror draw any reasonable conclusion in which he conscientiously
believes. The ideal balance of these apparently opposing interests would
result in the agreement of "improperly" hung juries and the preservation
of those "properly" deadlocked. An instruction, however, that, in every
instance, could selectively lead the stubborn or recalcitrant dissenting
juror to agreement without influencing the stand of a conscientious mi-
nority juror has not yet been framed. Consequently, critics believe that
the risk of coercion of sincere minority jurors is unjustifiably present in
Allen. 6 Moreover, the progeny of Allen v. United States reveal that any
judicial expense saved at the trial level is resurrected at the appellate
level. It is apparent, therefore, that the Allen charge has produced ques-
tionable results on both substantive and administrative grounds, lending
support to the instant court's decision to abandon it. The adoption of
the ABA standard jury charge was based upon the belief that it will
reduce the appellate caseload previously generated by Allen. The ABA
project has not, in any meaningful sense, recommended abolishment of
the Allen charge, but merely has deleted the reference to the majority-
minority division. The deletion was suggested because this element has
been widely thought to contain the true dangers to the free and unfettered
judgment and expression of conscience upon which the jury system is
based.17 The ABA charge wisely reduces the risk, inherent in Allen, that
the jury's findings of fact will be improperly influenced by "some sort
of Gallup Poll conducted in the deliberation room." 8 Although this
modification represents an improvement from a substantive viewpoint,
it is unlikely that the number of appeals spawned by this instruction will
be reduced significantly. Since the constitutionality of a properly framed
Allen charge uniformly has been upheld by the courts, most appeals have
been based upon the trial judge's additions to or deletions from the
approved instruction. It is apparent that, like Allen, the ABA charge
could suffer from the same coercive embellishments added by the trial
judge in an attempt to give his instruction a personal touch. 9 This source
of appellate cases, however, cannot be eliminated by changes in the
wording of the sanctioned instruction, but must be governed by the
wisdom and discretion of the trial judge, coupled with his desire to be
26. See materials cited note 10 supra.
27. United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407,417-19 (3d Cir. 1969).
28. Id. at 417.
29. Cf. cases cited note 14 supra.
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upheld on appeal. The abandonment of the majority-minority element
of the Allen charge reduces the inherent risk of improper duress, but does
nothing to correct the problem of unwarranted variations of the sanc-
tioned instruction. As long as trial judges attempt to promote the agree-
ment of a deadlocked jury, appellate tribunals will be called upon to
distinguish precisely between proper guidance and improper coercion.
Criminal Procedure-Appellate Review-Federal Appel-
late Court May Remand Criminal Sentence Based on
Unverified Information
After a jury found defendant guilty of knowingly transporting con-
traband drugs,' the presiding federal district judge indicated that based
on the evidence presented the minimum mandatory sentence of five
years' imprisonment was appropriate. The government prosecutor, how-
ever, requested that a presentence report 2 be prepared before final sen-
tence was imposed. At the sentencing hearing a presentence study was
delivered to the court that contained broad unsworn statements charging
defendant with serious drug-related violations 3 and on the basis of that
report the trial judge imposed the maximum statutory sentence of twenty
years' imprisonment.' On appeal, defendant contended that since the
1. Defendant was found guilty on November 2, 1970 of violating 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964)
(repealed by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, § 1101(a), 84 Stat. 1291), which provided that: "Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports
or brings any narcotic drug into the United States. . . or in any manner facilitates the transporta-
tion. . . or sale of any such narcotic drug. . . shall be imprisoned not less than five or more than
twenty years and, in addition, may be fined not more than $20,000 .. "
2. The primary purpose of presentence reports is to comment upon the character and person-
ality of the defendant. The use of these reports, although encouraged, is discretionary with the trial
judge. No particular procedure is employed in conducting the investigation. See FED. R. CRmI. P.
32(c)(1). For a comprehensive study of the use of presentence reports see Lehrich, The Use and
Disclosure of Presentence Reports in the United States, 47 F.R.D. 225 (1969); Note, The Present-
ence Report: An Empirical Study of Its Use in the Federal Criminal Process, 58 GEo. L.J. 451
(1970).
3. The report, based upon the unsworn memorandum of a federal narcotics agent, stated that
defendant was a clever and intelligent dealer in heroin and had been the chief supplier to the western
Washington state area. The report further charged that defendant had made numerous trips to
Mexico in order to purchase heroin, and that defendant sold the heroin in the United States earning
a profit of approximately $140,000 every 2 weeks.
4. Because of the severity of the sentence, the court directed the Government to submit factual
material sufficient to support the conclusion of the report. When submitted, the substantiating
information consisted of further unsworn information, but the court found it sufficient to allow
the maximum sentence to stand.
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information in the report was largely unsubstantiated and was too vague
to be proved false with reasonable effort, 5 the trial judge should not have
relied upon it in imposing sentence. The Government, while also arguing
the merits,' primarily contended that federal appellate courts have no
right to review sentences that are within statutory limits. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, held, sentence vacated and remanded. A fed-
eral appellate court may remand a sentence predicated on unverified
information. United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971).
Under section one of the Judicature Act of 18797 federal circuit
courts of appeals were given jurisdiction to review all lower federal court
sentences that required imprisonment. The Act was held to establish that
if, upon the whole record, it appeared that the penalty imposed by the
lower court was not in conformity with law, then a circuit court could
modify the sentence, even when the sentence was within the statutory
maximum." When federal appellate jurisdiction was transferred to the
courts of appeals in 189 1,1 however, no provision similar to section one
of the Judicature Act was incorporated into the new legislation. Even
though the Supreme Court indicated that all powers created under the
Judicature Act were retained by the Act of 1891,10 the Ninth Circuit
held, in Freeman v. United States," and other courts of appeals have
since agreed," that in the absence of a specific statutory mandate, federal
appellate courts cannot review sentences that are within statutory limits.
Refusal to review has been justified on two grounds. First, appellate
5. Defendant's counsel pointed out that he could not imagine what type of investigation
would establish satisfactorily that his client was not, as charged, "the biggest dealer in the Western
States."
6. The Government argued in the alternative that evidence of criminal activity not resulting
in conviction may be considered in imposing sentence.
7. Act of March 3, 1879, ch. 176, § 1, 20 Stat. 354, provides that: "The circuit court for
each judicial district shall have jurisdiction of writs of error on all criminal cases tried before the
district court where the sentence is imprisonment. . . and in such case a respondent feeling himself
aggrieved by a decision of a district court, may except to the opinion of the court ....
8. Bates v. United States, 10 F. 92 (7th Cir. 1881).
9. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517,26 Stat. 826.
10. Ballew v. United States, 160 U.S. 187, 201-02 (1895) (the general grant of power to
modify sentences was not reiterated in express terms when additional subject-matter jurisdiction
was vested in the circuit courts in 1891, but the authority was deemed to be already adequately
provided by the statute of 1879).
I1. 243 F. 353 (9th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 600 (1919).
12. See, e.g., Bowman v. United States, 350 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v.
Kapsalis, 214 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1954); United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1952);
Beckett v. United States, 84 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1936); Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338 (8th
Cir. 1930); Bailey v. United States, 284 F. 126 (7th Cir. 1922); Voege v. United States, 270 F. 219
(2d Cir. 1920).
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judges have felt that the trial judge was in a better position to determine
the proper sentence since he had the opportunity to observe a defendant's
demeanor." Secondly, the courts of appeals have feared that appellate
review would open the floodgates to frivolous appeals, thereby increas-
ing the burden both upon trial judges who would have to write sentence
reports and upon practicing attorneys who would be appointed to repre-
sent the influx of indigent defendants.14 Despite these justifications, the
general rule of nonreview in certain situations, has operated harshly with
respect to the criminal defendant, and in response, some courts have
developed limited exceptions to the general rule. When, for example, a
trial judge in determining the sentence has relied upon evidence obtained
in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights, 15 or when the sentence
has been based in part upon convictions in which defendant was not
represented by counsel, 6 appellate courts, without discarding the general
rule of nonreview, have remanded the case for resentencing.17 Since pre-
sentence reports frequently include unverified information obtained by
a probation officer, escape from the general rule often has been sought
to overturn sentences based upon the allegations made in such reports.
In Townsend v. Burke,"8 for example, defendant was sentenced on the
basis of evidence contained in the presentence report even though the
evidence already had been proved false. In overturning the sentence,the
Supreme Court held that fourteenth amendment due process requires
that a sentence be based on accurate information. Having affirmatively
13. See, e.g., Brewster, Appellate Review of Sentences, 40 F.R.D. 79 (1967); Hruska.
Appellate Review of Sentences, 8 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 10 (1969); Note, A Plea for Appellate Review
of Sentences, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 410,417 (1971). See also note 29 infra and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Brewster, Appellate Review of Sentences, 40 F.R.D. 79, 87 (1967); Frankel,
The Sentencing Morass, and a Suggestion for Reform, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 365, 379 (1967); Wyzan-
ski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1292-93 (1952).
15. See, e.g., Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 612-13 (9th Cir. 1968) (evidence
unlawfully seized cannot be considered in sentencing hearing); cf. Armpriester v. United States, 256
F.2d 294, 297 (4th Cir. 1958) (court would not condone use of evidence obtained in breach of law).
16. See, e.g., Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967) (conviction based on evidence of prior
uncounseled convictions not allowed to stand); Tucker v. United States, 431 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir.
1970) (sentence remanded because of reasonable probability that trial judge imposed heavier sen-
tence based on prior convictions in which defendant was not represented by counsel).
17. For other cases in which the sentence has been vacated and remanded by federal appellate
courts see Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (imposition of a heavier sentence
because defendant refused to confess his guilt after jury had found him guilty); Thomas v. United
States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966) (imposition of heavier sentence because defendant chose to be
tried by jury rather than plead guilty); United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960)
(defendant sentenced to longer term than codefendants even though all defendants had committed
same offense).
18. 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
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established in Townsend that some types of information could not be
considered in the sentencing process, the Supreme Court in Williams v.
New York 19 was faced with the problem of giving a more complete
definition of precisely what types of information the sentencing court
could use. Defendant, who had been sentenced on the basis of a present-
ence report containing evidence of other criminal activity,"0 challenged
the sentence on the ground that the court's failure to verify the informa-
tion in the report violated due process. In refusing to review the sentence,
the Supreme Court held that due process does not require that informa-
tion relied upon in sentencing be restricted to that given in court by
persons subject to cross-examination.2' The Court, however, failed to
specify how, at the sentencing hearing, this unverified information could
be shown to have met the accuracy requirement established in
Townsend, and if not shown to have met that requirement, whether the
sentence based on information of such little value would be permitted
to stand on appeal.
Acknowledging the general rule that federal appellate courts do not
review sentences that are within statutory limits, and noting the support
given to that rule by Williams, the instant court initially sought to
distinguish Williams from the case at bar. The court pointed out that,
in Williams, defendant broadly attacked the entire sentencing process,
and sought review of that process which would have been tantamount
to a second trial. The instant defendant, on the other hand, specifically
objected only to the trial judge's reliance upon definite information in
the presentence report. After cataloguing several decisions that similarly
distinguished between reviewing a sentence and merely deciding that
certain information should not have been relied upon by the trial judge,
22
the instant court concluded that it had the power to examine the reasons
upon which a sentence is based. Turning, therefore, to the instant case,
the court found that not only did defendant's sentence rest upon a weak
factual basis, but the defendant unjustifiably had the burden of disprov-
19. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
20. The report contained hearsay statements that charged Williams with the commission of
30 burglaries for which he had not been convicted. The judge also referred to certain activities shown
in the report that indicated Williams possessed "a morbid sexuality" and that, therefore, classified
him as a "menace to society." Id. at 244.
21. Id. at 251.
22. See cases cited notes 15-17 supra.
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ing these unsubstantiated facts.21 Admittedly extending prior law,24 the
instant court held that since the sentence was based upon facts which
were of no value, the sentence could not stand.
The instant decision merits attention both for what it did, and for
what it refused to do. First, the instant court in effect shifted the burden
of proof on the validity of information contained in presentence reports
from the criminal defendant to the state. This indirect restriction on the
preparation of presentence reports should operate so as to limit the types
of information contained in such reports with the result that presentence
reports will become more verifiably accurate, and that sentences based
thereon will become less arbitrary. Secondly, although the instant court
had the opportunity to reject the general rule of nonreview, it chose
instead to create an exception to that rule. Whether constrained by
precedent,2 5 or fearful of opening the floodgates to inconsequential ap-
peals,26 the court distinguished between reviewing a sentence and review-
ing the bases for that sentence. The distinction, however, from the stand-
point both of appellate courts and of criminal defendants, is difficult to
perceive. Since any appeal of any sentence necessarily would include a
consideration of the bases for that sentence, an appellate court, in effect,
would have to engage in the same sort of investigation no matter which
method of review it chose. Moreover, the sole distinction for the criminal
defendant is the elapsed time between conviction and final judgment. If
the sentence were reviewed, an appellate court could impose a new sen-
tence without further consideration at the trial level. If an appellate court
merely reviewed the bases for that sentence, however, it could only va-
cate the sentence and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing.
Furthermore, this slight difference is erased if the original sentence is
affirmed on appeal. Since the distinction drawn by the instant court is
negligible, and since the court already had decided on the merits that this
sentence was improper, the court easily could have taken the additional
23. The court stated that it thought "it a great miscarriage of justice to expect [defendant]
or her attorney to assume the burden and expense of proving that she is not the large scale dealer
that the anonymous informant says that she is. . . . A rational penal system must have some
concern for the probable accuracy of the informational inputs in the sentencing process." 448 F.2d
at 634.
24. Id.
25. See cases cited note 12 supra.
26. See Appellate Review of Sentences, A Symposium at the Judicial Conference of the
United States Court ofAppeals for the Second Circuit, 32 F.R.D. 249 (1962).
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step and overturned the general rule of nonreview. That action would
have raised the question whether appellate review of all criminal sen-
tences is desirable. Aside from the floodgates argument that appellate
review would result in overcrowded dockets and fatigued judges,'2 some
scholars have suggested that review of all criminal sentences would cre-
ate a superficial uniformity in sentences and would curtail proper exer-
cise of creative discretion in the district courts.2 9 Others have suggested
that the increased costs for records necessary for appeal would place an
unwanted burden upon taxpayers in general.30 A more compelling objec-
tion to total review is that it would allow a sentence to be imposed by a
judge who did not have the benefit of observing the demeanor both of
the defendant and of those furnishing information relevant to the defen-
dant's sentencing.3 Consequently, appellate review of all sentences with-
in the statutory maximum would be as undesirable as no review at all.
32
Perhaps the instant court's failure to repudiate the general rule of non-
review while in effect permitting review represents an awareness that
27. There are 2 grounds upon which the court might have relied in overturning the general
rule of nonreview. First, the court could have relied on Ballew v. United States, 160 U.S. 187 (1895),
wherein the Supreme Court acknowledged that federal circuit courts of appeals have the right to
review all criminal sentences. See note 10 supra and accompanying text. Secondly, it has been
argued that § 2106 of the Judicial Code, which grants federal appellate courts the power to modify
any judgment of a lower federal court and enter a more appropriate judgment, has always provided
the appellate courts with the right to review criminal cases in situations like the instant case. See,
e.g., Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462, 468 (10th Cir. 1959) (dissenting opinion); Hall,
Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 521 (1937). Section 2106 provides
that a federal appellate court may "affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment,
decree, or order. . . and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment. . . as may be just under
the circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1964).
28. See Brewster, supra note 13; Note, Appellate Review of Sentencing Procedure, 74 YALE
L.J. 379 (1964).
29. See Sobeloff, A Recommendation for Appellate Review of Criminal Sentence, 21
BROOKLYN L. REv. 2 (1954); Tydings, Ensuring Rational Sentences, The Case for Appellate
Review, 53 JUDICATURE 68 (1969); Weigel, Appellate Revision of Sentences: To Make the
Punishment Fit the Crime, 20 STAN. L. REv. 405 (1968).
31. For a comprehensive study on the arguments for and against appellate review see
Appellate Review of Sentences, A Symposium at the Judicial Conference of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 32 F.R.D. 249 (1962).
32. For a discussion of the undesirability of the general rule of nonreview see ABA PROJECT
ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW
OF SENTENCING (Tent. Draft, April 1967) at 1-2, 13-14. See also Note, A Plea for Appellate Review
of Sentences, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 410 (1971).
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until the legislature adopts a more workable system of sentencing re-
view, 33 substantial justice is in fact the standard that should be applied.
Environmental Protection-National Environmental Pol-
icy Act-Federal Agencies Must Give Full and Immedi-
ate Consideration to Environmental Factors in Their Pro-
ject Plans, Regardless of Compliance with Specific Qual-
ity Standards in Other Statutes
Petitioners, several conservation groups,' sought a declaratory
judgment that the Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC) licensing regu-
lations,2 promulgated in compliance with the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA),3 were inadequate and illegal.4 Section 102 of
N EPA5 requires all federal agencies to consider environmental issues as
33. In recent years a number of proposals to permit review of sentences by the courts of
appeals have been introduced into Congress although none has been enacted into law. See S. 1561,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 1540, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 2722, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965); S. 823, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963); S. 2879, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); S. 1692, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. 3914, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); H.R. 270, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1957); S. 1480, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H.R. 4932,84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). The Advisory
Committee on Sentencing and Review of the American Bar Association also has suggested statu-
tory provisions for review. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2722 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements
in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 83-102 (1966).
1. There were 3 petitioners: the Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, which is composed
of various Maryland civic groups; the Sierra Club; and the National Wildlife Federation. Wall
Street J., July 26, 1971, at 9, col. 2.
2. Statement of General Policy and Procedure: Implementation of the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act of 1969 (P.L. 91-190) (AEC Regulations), 10 C.F.R. § 50, app. D (1971).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
4. In another suit, consolidated for argument and decision with the instant one, the same
petitioners challenged the AEC's final order issuing a construction permit to build the $300,000,000
Calvert Cliffs nuclear power plant on the western shore of the Chesapeake Bay, about 45 miles
southeast of Washington, D.C. The AEC had refused to hear petitioners' evidence that alleged the
dangers of thermal pollution to the Bay's ecological system and ultimately to aquatic life consumed
as human food. Petitioners had tried unsuccessfully to invoke a Maryland state law to stop con-
struction. Petitioners appealed the AEC order to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Unlike the 2 cases in note 42 infra, which were held not ripe for review because no final order had
been issued by the AEC, petitioners here appealed from a final order that granted a construction
permit. The instant court remanded the cases and directed the AEC to formulate new regulations
consistent with its opinion. At the time of the decision, the plant was about 45% complete. See
generally People's Counsel v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 259 Md. 409, 270 A.2d 105 (1970); CCH
ATOM. EN. L. REP. 10,155, 11,578.01-.02, 16,598, 16,611; Wall Street J., July 26, 1971, at 9.
col. 2.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
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routinely as they consider other issues in their decision-making pro-
cesses. Furthermore, in order to insure that this consideration is given,
the Act establishes procedures that require each agency to file a detailed
statement evaluating the environmental impact of its proposed activities.
Petitioners alleged that the A EC's regulations failed in several respects
to satisfy the strict mandate of NEPA.6 First, the regulations did not
require the final decision-making body of the AEC to take the initiative
in raising environmental issues; secondly, they did not require immediate
compliance with NEPA's procedural duties; and thirdly, they excused
the AEC from having to file a section 102 environmental impact state-
ment on water quality when the proposed facility was already certified
as complying with the water quality standards of other government
agencies. 7 In addition, petitioners argued that until the AEC can make
an evaluation of the environmental impact of each project,8 the AEC
must suspend all ongoing projects whose licensing decisions failed to
comply with NEPA procedures. Respondent AEC contended that
N EPA's mandate is vague and, therefore, permits discretion in initiating
consideration of environmental issues.9 Respondent further claimed that
a fourteen-month transition period was needed to achieve full compli-
ance with N EPA's procedures in order to avoid delay in the use of new
power facilities urgently needed to alleviate the national energy crisis.10
Finally, because section 104 of N EPA permits compliance with specific
quality standards to supplant the more general duties set forth under
section 102,11 the AEC denied that it was required to make an environ-
mental impact statement on water quality. On appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, held, the Atomic
Energy Commission was ordered to promulgate new regulations. The
National Environmental Policy Act requires a federal agency to initiate
an immediate and complete evaluation of the environmental effects of
proposed actions even when the action complies with specific environ-
mental quality standards of other federal or state agencies. Calvert
6. See I ENVIR. L. REP. 65047, 67551-53 (1971) (digest of cases).
7. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1116-17
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
8. 1 ENVIR. L. REP. 67552 (1971).
9. 449F.2datl112.
10. Id. at 1119.
11. NEPA § 104 provides: "Nothing in section 102 or 103 shall in any way affect the
specific statutory obligations of any Federal agency (1) to comply with criteria or standards of
environmental quality, (2) to coordinate or consult with any other Federal or State agency, or (3)
to act, or refrain from acting contingent upon the recommendations or certification of any other
Federal or State agency." 42 U.S.C. § 4334 (1970).
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Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy
Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Even before environmental problems became a popular public con-
cern, courts had found that some federal agencies were required to con-
sider and be sensitive to the possible adverse environmental effects of
projects under their supervision. For example, in two early cases involv-
ing the Federal Power Commission, licenses for hydroelectric facilities
were set aside because, in evaluating project alternatives that were better
adapted to all uses of the river, the Commission had failed to assess the
potential damage to the river's scenic beauty 12 and the public's interest
in preserving wilderness areas and wildlife. 3 Despite occasional interpo-
sitions of judicial authority to compel consideration of the environmen-
tal impact of federal activities, the courts did not have a coherent, fully
integrated national policy on the environment around which to pattern
their decisions. With the 1969 enactment of the National Environmental
Policy Act, 4 however, the absence of such a policy came to an end.
NEPA manifests the federal government's policy "to promote efforts
which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment."',- Under
the procedures outlined in section 102,1 federal agencies must make a
12. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
13. Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428, 450 (1967). On remand to the Federal Power Commission,
the NEPA § 102 requirements for full evaluation of the environmental impact were followed.
Presiding Examiner's Initial Decision on Remand in Pacific Northwest Power, Project No. 2243,
and Washington Public Power Supply System, Project No. 2273, 1 ENVIR. L. REP. 30017 (FPC,
Feb. 23, 1971).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970). NEPA is essentially Senator Jackson's bill, S. 1075, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), which was introduced on February 18, 1969. It was passed by the Senate
on July 10, 1969, and the House on December 22, 1969. S. 1075 was very similar to S. 2805, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), a bill that Senators Jackson and Kuchel had introduced on December 15,
1967. Although that particular bill was never passed, it did result in a congressional colloquium
on July 17, 1968, to discuss a national policy for the environment. Ideas for S. 1075 also came
from the Resources and Conservation Act introduced as S. 2549, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) by
Senator Murray on August 17, 1959, but which never passed. It called for more efficient machinery
in the President's office to coordinate resource conservation on the basis of national goals. Further
background to S. 1075 was provided by S. 2282, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), the Ecological
Research and Surveys Act introduced by Senator Nelson on July 13, 1965, that resulted in hearings
in the 89th Congress. Hearings on S. 2282 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). It also was not passed. The bill made provisions to cope with
the inadequate use and application of ecological knowledge by federal agencies as research methods
to ensure better management of the physical environment. 115 CONG. REc. 29066 (1969) (remarks
of Senator Jackson).
15. NEPA § 2,42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
16. NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970)..The detailed statement must include (a) the
environmental impact of the proposed action, (b) any adverse environmental effects that cannot be
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detailed statement that both evaluates the environmental impact of pro-
posed agency action and suggests alternatives to the proposal. The sec-
tion 102 duties are designed to ensure that the government will fulfill its
responsibility "to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, pro-
grams, and resources" so that environmental protection is maximized.'
7
Pursuant to that purpose, NEPA provides for the establishment of the
Council on Environmental Quality (C EQ),' 8 which is authorized to issue
guidelines to the various federal agencies to aid them in the integration
of NEPA into their decision-making processes.' This integration of
NEPA, however, represented a difficult problem for CEQ to solve.
N EPA, although clear in its general meaning, fails to provide a time-
table for implementing its section 102 procedures, aside from directing
compliance with them "to the fullest extent possible."' 2° On its face, the
statute does not require immediate, as opposed to gradual, implementa-
tion. NEPA also does not explicitly require the application of its stan-
dards and procedures to agency actions that were already under way at
the time of its enactment. The CEQ guidelines21 attempted to resolve
these uncertainties within the framework of NEPA's ambiguous lan-
guage. Dealing directly with the question of NEPA's application to
ongoing projects, the guidelines provided that when it was impractical
to reassess a project's initial course of action, its future course of action
had to be "shaped so as to minimize adverse environmental conse-
quences."-2 Based on the CEQ guidelines, the AEC established its own
regulations for the implementation of NEPA.?2 It created a transition
period ending fourteen months after N EPA's effective date, 24 during
avoided, (c) alternatives to the proposed action, (d) the relationship between local short-term uses
of the environment, and maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (e) any
irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources that would be involved in the proposed
action. Comments from appropriate federal, state, and local agencies authorized to set and enforce
environmental quality standards must "accompany" the proposal through the agency review pro-
cess.
17. NEPA § 101(b),42U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1970).
18. NEPA §§ 201-07,42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-47 (1970).
19. Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 531 (1971).
20. NEPA § 102,42U.S.C. § 4332(1970).
21. Council on Environmental Quality, Statements on Proposed Federal Actions Affecting
the Environment, Interim Guidelines (CEQ Interim Guidelines), 35 Fed. Reg. 7390 (1970).
22. Id. § 1I, 35 Fed. Reg. at 7392.
23. AEC Regulations, 10 C.F.R. § 50, app. D (1971).
24. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 was signed into law by President Nixon
on January 1, 1970. Section 11 of the AEC Regulations declares that the AEC's full procedure
under NEPA is not required for license applications when the notice of hearing on the application
is published in the Federal Register before March 4, 1971. Id. § 11.
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which time both new and ongoing projects were not required to be in
full compliance with N EPA. In justification, the AEC emphasized the
public interest in preventing a delay in meeting the nation's electric
power needs.25 The early judicial interpretations of NEPA focused
mainly on the issue of NEPA's application to projects not completed at
the time of its passage. While these decisions are inconsistent,26 the most
recent cases indicate a trend toward giving N EPA only prospective ef-
fect, that is, applying NEPA to all decisions on new and ongoing pro-
jects made after the Act's passage. One court z7 found, for example, that
Congress did not intend to undo agency action already in progress by
applying NEPA retroactively. The court observed instead that NEPA
applies to future agency decisions and new programs, and requires only
the improvement or upgrading of pre-NEPA projects. Prior to the in-
stant case, however, the issue of applying N EPA duties to projects initi-
ated prior to its effective date had not been raised at the federal appellate
level. Similarly, no court had dealt with the question of temporarily
delaying the full implementation of NEPA for projects initiated after
passage of the Act, such as the AEC regulations permit.
The possible overlap between NEPA and other federal or state
statutes is recognized in section 10428 which states that NEPA cannot
be construed to hinder or prevent compliance with specific environmen-
tal standards of other government agencies. In the event that such an
overlap occurs, two closely related questions are raised. The first is
whether compliance with the other federal or state law makes compli-
ance with NEPA unnecessary. If the answer to the first question is no,
then the second is whether the standards and procedures of both acts
must be followed. An example of the overlap problem can be seen in the
conflict over the effect of heated waste water discharges into streams and
25. Id.
26. For cases holding that NEPA does apply see Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v.
United States, I ENVIR. REP. CASES 1303 (W.D. Tex.), dismissed as moot, 430 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir.
1970) (although the FHA had approved a loan, no federal money had been expended and no
construction begun); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 324 F. Supp. 878
(D.D.C. 1971) (although the Cross-Florida Barge Canal was one-third completed, an injunction
was granted pending fulfillment of NEPA duties for the remaining portions to be constructed). For
cases holding that N EPA does not apply see Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett,
315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970) (contract finalized and construction begun, although no federal
funds had been expended); Investment Syndicates, Inc. v. Richmond, 318 F. Supp. 1038 (D. Ore.
1970); Bucklein v. Volpe, I ENVIR. L. REP. 20043 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (NEPA created no duties
enforceable by courts).
27. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark.
1971).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 4334 (1970).
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rivers, a common disadvantage to nuclear power reactors. The Water
Quality Improvement Act (WQIA) 29 requires federal facilities to be cer-
tified in accordance with specific state water quality standards. NEPA
requires all federal agencies to give independent consideration to the
environmental impact of their activities, including a consideration of the
effect on water quality. Thus, on the surface at least, the AEC would be
forced to serve two statutory masters-NEPA and the applicable state
law under WQIA-in constructing a nuclear reactor that complies with
environmental quality standards. During the debate on WQIA, Senator
Jackson, the original sponsor of NEPA, addressed the problem of re-
solving a conflict between the two potentially applicable environmental
laws by noting the existence of a "compromise" between the two acts
that would exempt the Atomic Energy Commission from filing a section
102 environmental impact statement on water quality.3 1 In marked con-
trast to this Senate floor discussion is the conference report on N EPA,
which indicates that a federal agency can be exempt from carrying out
the procedural duties under section 102 only when an agency's operating
law expressly prohibits compliance !.3 In addition, the report states that
the agency can not use an "excessively narrow construction of the exist-
ing statutory authorizations to avoid compliance. ' 32 The CEQ guide-
lines, however, apparently relied on the "compromise" idea from the
legislative history to make compliance with the procedural requirements
of N EPA and WQIA mutually exclusive. They provided that mere refer-
ence to previous certification of compliance with state water quality
standards was sufficient to comply with the section 102 environmental
impact statement requirements.3 Extending the CEQ guidelines further,
the A EC regulations indicated that not only would a compliance certifi-
cate "supersede pro tanto" 34 the section 102 impact statement, but that
it also would be "dispositive" of the question whether there was any
adverse effect on the environment.3 5 At the end of 1970, hearings held
29. The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1155-56, 1158, 1160-
75 (1970), was passed by Congress in March 1970. It amended the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970).
30. 115 CONG. REc. 29056 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson).
31. For pre-N EPA agency operating legislation, the conflict would come if the agency is
prohibited from following a certain procedure that would be required under NEPA or if it is
required to do certain things that NEPA disallows. Post-NEPA laws would conflict only if the
agency was expressly exempted from following certain NEPA procedures.
32. CONFERENCE REPORT ON NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AcT OF 1969, No. 91-765
(Dec. 17, 1969), 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2770 (1969).
33. CEQ Interim Guidelines § 7(b), 35 Fed. Reg. at 7392.
34. AEC Regulations § 9, 10 C.F.R. § 50, app. D (1971).
35. Id. § I I(b)..
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on the first year's experience with N EPA revealed congressional antago-
nism toward the AEC's interpretation of the Act.36 Although the AEC
defended its interpretation by claiming that the procedure had been
reviewed and approved by the CEQ,37 the subsequent congressional re-
port on the hearings indicated otherwise. It showed that the CEQ, far
from approving the AEC's interpretation of NEPA, merely had con-
formed to its policy of refraining from publicly challenging noncomply-
ing agencies. 38 In the same vein, the report also attacked the AEC's
"narrow and restrictive view of [its] responsibilities under N EPA"139 and
recommended revision of its rules to require evaluation of the environ-
mental consequences of a proposed activity beyond mere certification of
compliance with other federal or state water quality standards." In
Zabel v. Tabb,4' N EPA, and specifically section 104, was interpreted on
the federal appellate level for the first time. There the Fifth Circuit was
faced with the issue whether the Secretary of the Army could refuse for
substantial ecological reasons to grant a dredging permit even though
the project did not violate the Corps of Engineers' navigation protection
standards. In supporting the Secretary's discretion to reject the applica-
tion under these circumstances, the court held that N EPA created a duty
for the projectdecision-maker to consult with other agencies on environ-
mental questions and to evaluate their recommendations in light of the
total impact of the project. Aside from Zabel, no other decisions have
dealt with the question whether specific agency or project standards
override the N EPA duties. Recently, two courts 42 refused to hear appeals
challenging the AEC's interpretation of its NEPA duties. They ruled
36. Representative Dingell, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation, stated that the "AEC is in great trouble" if its only compliance with the impact
statement is acceptance of a certificate. Hearings on the Administration of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, app. A, 182-85 (1970).
37. Id. at 199-205.
38. House CoII,. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, ADMINISTRATION OF THE NA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (P.L. 91-190), H.R. REP. No. 316, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 31-
32 (1970).
39. Id. at 30.
40. Id. at 6.
41. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,401 U.S. 910 (1971).
42. Thermal Ecology Must Be Preserved v. AEC, 433 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Lloyd
Harbor Study Group, Inc. v. Seaborg, I ENVIR. L. REP. 20188 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1971). A third
case, In re Consumers Power Co., I ENVIR. L. REP. 65045, 67509 (1971) (digest), was settled out
of court when conservation groups promised not to intervene if the company would install cooling
towers and cut down to "essentially zero" the radioactive liquid release system at the plant. The
company was applying for an interim license to operate the plant at 60% capacity. Wall Street J.,
Sept. 28, 197 1, at 13, col. 4. See also note 4 supra.
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that the AEC decisions were not ripe for review, thus leaving unsettled
the conflict between NEPA's requirement of strict compliance with its
section 102 procedures and the apparent exemption from these require-
ments embodied in both NEPA's legislative "compromise" with WQIA
and the CEQ guidelines.
Examining the purpose of NEPA, the court in the instant case
observed that section 101 of the Act established a substantive policy
strictly applicable to all federal agencies and departments. The court
observed further that the principal object of N EPA, and more specifi-
cally of the procedures outlined in section 102, is to insure that environ-
mental issues are considered "to the fullest extent possible '4 3 before any
federal agency action takes place.14 Analyzing section 102 in detail, the
court found that its requirement of a "detailed statement" assessing the
environmental impact of a project and the viability of alternative ap-
proaches was meant to be more than a pro forma ritual. In the court's
estimation, the passage of section 102 contemplated an exhaustive, sys-
tematic, interdisciplinary study of the environmental consequences of
proposed agency action, the performance of which was itself evidence
that an agency had considered environmental issues on the same footing
as all others.4" Moreover, section 102 imposes a duty that the instant
court held deserving of rigorous enforcement, and one that permits an
exception only when a particular agency's operations expressly prohibit
or make impossible full compliance with section 102. The court then
turned its attention to the specific AEC regulations under attack. After
examining regulations prohibiting the AEC from independently raising
environmental issues and removing these issues from the normal review
process unless raised by an intervenor, the court found them in violation
of NEPA.46 It pointed out that NEPA requires the AEC to consider
43. This is to be compared with the more flexible standard for implementing the general
substantive policy of § 101 that "leaves room for a responsible exercise of discretion and may not
require particular substantive results in particular problematic instances." 449 F.2d at 1112. The
qualifying phrase "to the fullest extent possible" in § 102 "does not provide an escape hatch for
footdragging agencies . . . . Congress did not intend the Act to be such a paper tiger." 449 F.2d
at 1114.
44. Senator Jackson used the phrase "action forcing" to characterize the procedural duties.
115 CONG. REc. 40416 (1969).
45. Section 102 requires that environmental values be given "appropriate" consideration. On
this point, the instant court states: "§ 102(2)(B) cannot be interpreted to blunt the thrust of the
whole Act or to give agencies broad discretion to downplay environmental factors in their decision
making processes. The Act requires consideration 'appropriate' to the problem of protecting our
threatened environment, not consideration 'appropriate' to the whims, habits or other particular
concerns of federal agencies." 449 F.2d at 1113.
46. The instant court explained that the AEC's "crabbed interpretation of NEPA makes a
mockery of the Act." 449 F.2d at 1117.
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environmental, technical, and economic issues alike and, in addition,
imposes an affirmative duty on the AEC itself to raise environmental
problems. Similarly, the court dismissed the contention that N EPA does
not command immediate compliance with its requirements. Unper-
suaded by the AEC's argument that a transition period was needed
before NEPA could be implemented, the court asserted that from the
absence of a timetable in the Act, it can be inferred that Congress
expected immediate compliance with NEPA's procedures." Continuing
its analysis of the AEC regulations, the court rejected the AEC's inter-
pretation that section 104 dispensed with the need for consideration of
a project's possible adverse effects on water whenever certification was
obtained under the Water Quality Improvement Act. The court charac-
terized the AEC's reading of section 104 as a "total abdication of
responsibility"4 that had little support in legislative history. While con-
ceding that section 104 requires obedience to the specific statutory obli-
gations binding upon an agency, the court pointed out that the WQIA
and N EPA were not mutually exclusive in their requirements49 and that
the AEC could comply with both. In short, the court held that the plain
meaning of the Act would govern, and the AEC would have to make an
independent evaluation of a project's environmental impact on water
quality, notwithstanding certification under the WQIA. Finally, the
court took up the AEC's contention that projects begun prior to
N EPA's enactment were not fully subject to its mandate and procedures.
The AEC's regulations assumed that for these projects mere filing of
environmental impact reports would suffice. The court, however, found
that a refusal to consider project alternatives that would maximize envi-
ronmental protection did not fulfill the statutory obligation of reducing
environmental damage "to the fullest extent possible." As a result, the
court held that not only must the AEC evaluate the environmental im-
pact of all its projects, both old and new, but that it also must evaluate
possible modifications of its projects at any stage of construction.
As the first major court review of the National Environmental
Policy Act, the instant decision should establish a strong precedent in
47. Judge F. Skelly Wright, the author of the instant decision, noted: "In view of the
importance of environmental consideration during the agency review process. . . such a [14 month]
time lag is shocking." 449 F.2d at 1119.
48. It was the conclusion of the court that § 104 of NEPA does not permit the complete
abdication of responsibility exercised by the AEC. 449 F.2d at 1127.
49. Since there seemed to be little doubt on the part of the court that the AEC could conduct
the NEPA balancing-of-interests analysis consistent with WQIA, the court found that § 104 of
NEPA did not exempt the AEC from complying with both Acts. 449 F.2d at 1125.
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favor of the Act's rigorous enforcement. It strictly construes N EPA's
procedural requirements and, as a result, increases the probability that
the Act eventually will produce a uniform and generally applicable ap-
proach to environmental issues throughout governmental agencies and
departments. In terms of national policy, that objective is plainly one
of the Act's desired ends. To understand it in a clearer perspective, one
need look back no earlier than the immediate pre-NEPA period when
federal agencies were not subject to the Act's mandate. The considera-
tion given to environmental issues was infrequent and superficial. 0
Whether NEPA will alleviate that problem remains to be seen, but the
instant court's interpretation of the Act is a favorable sign. Aside from
forcefully advancing NEPA's basic policy, the instant decision should
have a significant impact on the practical level as well. In fact, one of
its immediate consequences is already becoming apparent. The decision
has necessitated a reconsideration of AEC licensing approvals for pro-
jects that were already under way at the time of NEPA's passage 5' since
in none of those cases was there the requisite examination of environ-
mental issues. The instant court indicated that suspension of a project
would be reasonable pending a full consideration by the agency of all
relevant environmental issues. It also indicated that the modification of
project plans would be warranted when the environmental damage from
continuation of a project as originally designed exceeded its economic
and social value. Naturally, the AEC opposes any judicial action that
will result in the interruption of construction on its nuclear power plant
projects. In the instant case, it argued that the greatest dispatch in the
construction of these facilities is necessary in light of the national power
crisis. While it scarcely can be doubted that a severe shortage of electri-
cal energy exists on occasion, the AEC's argument against the applica-
tion of NEPA to pre-NEPA ongoing projects is basically in terrorem.
If NEPA's mandate is complied with scrupulously, affected AEC pro-
jects will certainly experience delay and disruption. The cost to the
public in terms of tax money and an increased susceptibility to power
shortages, however, is one that Congress has determined that society
should pay. There are yet more basic reasons for ignoring the AEC's
argument. In the long run, the potential damage to the environment as
a result of air and water pollution is far greater than the temporary and
mild discomforts arising from delays in the production of electricity by
50. For a discussion of prior consideration of environmental issues see notes 12-14 supra and
accompanying text.
51. See I CCH ATOM. EN. L. REP. 3583.
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nuclear power facilities. More importantly, there are no factual grounds
for the AEC's fear that interruption of its ongoing projects will seriously
handicap the nation's ability to deal with power shortages. The present
ability of nuclear power plants to alleviate an energy crisis52 is slight
indeed. In 1968, for example, nuclear power generated only eight-tenths
of one percent of the total electricity in the United States, 53 and the AEC
has predicted that by 1980 nuclear power will fill only three percent of
the nation's total electricity needs.
54
N EPA's mandate applies to many agencies that are subject to other
environmental quality legislation. Although in section 104 of NEPA
Congress attempted to deal with the problem of statutory overlap, it was
uncertain before the instant decision how the courts would structure the
relationship between NEPA and the Water Quality Improvement Act.
At one time, both the former AEC regulations and the CEQ guidelines
were in agreement that mere reference to a water quality certificate
would suffice to fulfill the section 102 "detailed statement" requirement.
That was not the position of the instant court, however. Clarifying
N EPA's ambiguity on this point, the court stated that a certificate under
WQIA could not replace an independent agency evaluation of a project's
effect on water quality. The basis for the court's decision is sound. Had
it held otherwise, the AEC easily could have escaped its responsibilities
under N EPA, a result wholly inconsistent with the purposes of the Act.
In addition, it should be observed that compliance with WQIA could
very well be irrelevant to an agency's final action for NEPA purposes
since it does not necessarily mean that there is no environmental dam-
age. Compliance merely means that the damage, if it exists, comes
within tolerable limits for WQIA purposes. 55 Under N EPA, however,
the same result might not be forthcoming. N EPA's required comparison
of environmental effects with the social benefits of the project could lead
to the conclusion that environmental injury, acceptable under WQIA,
52. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DIVISION, LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, LI-
BRARY OF CONGRESS, THE ECONOMY, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1970); Hubbert, Energy
Resources, in ENVIRONMENT-REsOURCES, POLLUTION & SOCIETY (W. Murdoch ed. 1971); Special
Project-The Energy Crisis: The Need for Antitrust Action and Federal Regulation, 24 VAND. L.
REV. 705 (1971).
53. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DIVISION, supra note 52, at 26.
54. For this and other forecasts on hydroelectric and fossil fuels see Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S.
428,447 (1967).
55. The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 encourages state control of pollution to
navigable waters and state establishment of water quality standards. Thus, a state may license a
federal facility to discharge a certain amount of waste as long as state standards are not exceeded.
Therefore, some pollution damage to the water quality will occur. 33 U.S.C. § 1160 (1970).
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is wholly unacceptable within the broader context of N EPA's environ-
mental policy mandate. Even though the court's interpretation of section
102 seems unimpeachable, some criticism of this aspect of the decision
has emerged." The criticism has focused primarily on the lack of exper-
tise in the AEC to make an independent evaluation of a project's impact
on water quality. The only environmental impact analysis that the AEC
was initially intended to handle relates to the problem of radiation emis-
sion from nuclear facilities. Nevertheless, the instant decision indicates
that the AEC, as well as every other federal agency, will have to set up
new procedures and develop new expertise to carry out its expanded
duties under NEPA, particularly with respect to water quality. Cer-
tainly, that imposes a difficult adjustment burden which, if unrelieved,
could result in widely inconsistent decisions depending on the skill of an
agency's water quality evaluation experts. Apparently the validity of this
criticism has been recognized, and Congress has set out to accommodate
the interests of the federal agencies while at the same time leaving
NEPA's integrity intact. A Senate amendment 57 to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act frees licensing agencies from having to develop
their own expertise for evaluating water quality effect and puts this
burden on the Environmental Protection Agency, the federal agency
charged with overseeing federal actions affecting the environment. In
light of the criticism of the instant decison on this point, this amendment
seems to be a reasonable solution to the problem.
Despite the solid support given to environmentalists by the instant
decision, the decisiveness of their victory remains to be seen.58 The in-
stant court dealt solely with the adequacy of AEC regulations that theo-
56. Comments by Atomic Energy Commissioner William 0. Doub before the Senate Interior
and Insular Affairs Committee on November 3, 1971. BNA ENVIR. REP., 2 CURRENT DEv. 793
(Nov. 5. 1971).
57. Id. at 783. Senator Baker's amendment to § 511 of S. 2770, the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1971, was adopted. S. 2770 was passed 86-0 by the Senate.
58. Several recent cases have commented on the instant decision, but the application and
acceptance of it has not been consistent. In Kalur v. Resor, 3 ENVIR. REP. CASES 1458 (D.D.C.
Dec. 22, 1971), Calvert Cliffs was held to require that the Corps of Engineers must make a full
NEPA § 102 detailed environmental impact statement for permits granted for discharges into
navigable waters under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (Refuse Act) § 13, 33 U.S.C. § 407
(1970). The court held that the Corps could not rely on the determination made by the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency as conclusive regarding the effect of the discharges on water quality. The
Kalur decision could be in conflict with the Baker amendment to S. 2770, the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1971. See note 57 supra and accompanying text. In Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 3 ENVIR. RaP. CASES 1473 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 17, 1971),
the court granted a preliminary injunction against the sale of new oil leases off the coast of
Louisiana because the strict NEPA § 102 duties, as interpreted in the Calvert Cliffs decision, had
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retically were designed to implement NEPA- 9 It was not called upon to
decide the merits of an agency decision made in full compliance with
NEPA's procedures. Yet, what the courts decide in such a case is criti-
cally important to the public, and only a strict standard of judicial
review of agency decisions will advance the legislative policies embodied
in N EPA. This strict standard is necessary for two key reasons. The first
concerns the federal regulatory agencies as institutions, whose practices
have been criticized sharply in recent years." They have been accused
of serving the interests of the particular industry that they are supposed
to govern instead of protecting the interests of the public. As long as
these agencies exist, there is always the possibility that the AEC or some
other federal agency will comply with section 102 of NEPA and yet
reach a decision that is injurious to the environment. Only a forceful
application of NEPA's policy standards will counteract the traditional
tendency of federal agencies to ignore considerations that have an ad-
verse economic effect on the regulated industries. The second reason for
a strict standard of review is more obvious. The environmental crisis is
real and at a critical stage. When called upon to do so, courts must
utilize the available statutory mandates to prevent a worsening of air and
not been followed. The court found that there had not been a sufficiently thorough consideration
of alternative energy sources or the possibility of modifying current marketing policies with respect
to existing fuel supplies.
On the other hand, in Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 3 ENVIR. REP. CASES 1418 (10th Cir. Dec.
7, 1971), the court held that only the Forest Service was required to make a § 102 statement for a
project even though the Commerce Department's Economic Development Administration was a
major participant, contributing 80% of the construction costs. In his dissent, Judge Murrah argued
that the Calvert Cliffs decision required the Economic Development Administration also to consider
environmental issues "to the fullest extent possible" by filing a § 102 statement on the project. In
Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 3 ENVIR. RE. CASES 1421 (3d Cir. Dec. 1,
1971), the lower court decision was affirmed. See note 26 supra. Distinguishing the Calvert Cliffs
decision, the court pointed out that the final decision to build the road in question had been made
a month before the effective date of NEPA. It dismissed the facts that no actual construction had
begun by NEPA's effective date and that federal officials still had to make the final inspection of
the project. The court found that Congress had no intention of reopening decisions already made,
and hence NEPA did not apply.
59. The strength of the instant decision's mandate can be seen in the revised AEC regulations
that were issued on September 9, 1971. 36 Fed. Reg. 18071 (1971). Even these revised regulations,
however, may fail to pass muster under N EPA. For example, they allow for the issuance of a partial
operating license pending completion of a § 102 statement. Nevertheless, in lzaak Walton League
v. Schlesinger, 3 ENVIR. REP. CASES 1453 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 1971), the court granted a preliminary
injunction against issuing such a partial operating license for a nuclear power plant to function at
50% capacity until the § 102 statement was prepared and distributed. It reasoned that such opera-
tions constituted action under NEPA which required the § 102 statement as proof of consideration
of the environmental impact of the project.
60. See E. Cox, R. FELLMETH, & J. SCHULZ, THE NADER REPORT ON THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (1969).
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water pollution. If the federal agencies respond to the NEPA mandate
in the appropriate public spirit, the court's need to be vigilant will not
be so great. The AEC, for example, already has shown a shift in attitude
concerning this matter that is far more amenable to the public interest. 61
On the other hand, if the agencies tend to remain industry oriented, the
courts will have to be more skeptical than ever in reviewing environmen-
tal questions under NEPA and other acts. Anything less than that will
render such legislation ineffective and will intensify the environmental
crisis.
Torts-Condominiums-Condominium Unit Owner Has
Standing To Sue Unincorporated Unit Owners' Associa-
tion for Injuries Inflicted Because of the Association's
Negligence
Plaintiff, a condominium unit owner, sued the unit owners' associa-
tion for injuries allegedly caused by the association's negligent mainte-
nance of the condominium's common areas.' Plaintiff owned one of 60
units in the condominium and belonged to the management association
that controlled the project's common areas. The unit owners' associa-
tion demurred to the complaint, contending that a member of an unin-
corporated association has no standing to sue the association itself be-
61. The new chairman of the AEC outlined this shift in attitude in his first major speech to
the atomic energy industry: "It is not [the AEC's] responsibility, however, if a utility encounters
unanticipated costs because of a failure to do its job properly, failure to comply with procedures,
or because of a change in the law. We are sympathetic; we understand your problem, but it is your
problem.
"Finally-and let me underscore this point-it is not the AEC's responsibility to ignore in
your behalf an indication of Congressional intent, or to ignore the courts. We have had a fair
amount of advice on how to evade the clear mandate of the federal courts. It is advice that we do
not think proper to accept. If you regard the legislative or judicial framework as extreme or
unworkable, you have a clear remedy through the seeking of legislative relief. We sympathize with
the difficulties that you are facing, but we have no intention of evading our responsibilities under
the law. ...
"Let me reiterate: the Atomic Energy Commission, like any government agency, exists to serve
the public interest. The public interest may overlap, but it is not coincident with private interests.
Private interests may, and indeed through the operation of the well-known invisible hand are likely
to, serve the public interests. The motivation is different. The role of a government agency, designed
to achieve and enforce public goals, is distinct." Address by Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Chairman
of the Atomic Energy Commission, at the All-Conference Banquet of the Atomic Industrial Forum-
American Nuclear Society Annual Meeting, Bal Harbour, Fla., Oct. 20, 197 1.
1. Plaintiff tripped over a negligently placed water sprinkler.
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cause the negligence of any member is imputed to every other member.
Plaintiff maintained that even though he was a member of the unit
owners' association, he lacked sufficient control over the association to
be imputed with its negligence and, therefore, should have standing to
sue. The trial court sustained the demurrer. On appeal to the California
District Court of Appeal, held, reversed. Although a member of the
unincorporated unit owners' association, a condominium unit owner has
standing to sue the association for injuries caused by its negligence when
the association has a legal existence separate from its members and the
unit owner cannot directly control the association's activity. White v.
Cox, 17 Cal. App. 3d 824, 95 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1971).
Every purchaser of a condominium apartment acquires two prop-
erty interests 2-an ownership in severalty of the apartment unit itself
3
and an undivided ownership of the common areas as tenant in common
with other unit owners.4 Although condominiums existed as long ago as
500 B.C.,5 their recent proliferation stems from a 1961 amendment, to
the National Housing Act 7 that provides for insurance on condominium
mortgages if condominium ownership is recognized under the laws of the
state in which the condominium is located. Immediately after the pas-
sage of the amendment, state legislatures began passing condominium
enabling acts, which would ensure the availability of low down-payment,
federally insured mortgages.' The regulations enacted pursuant to the
National Housing Act originally required the establishment of a unit
owners' association in order for the condominium to qualify for a feder-
ally insured mortgage.' Although a unit owners' association is no longer
required by the regulations, the regulations still recognize its continuing
2. See generally Kerr, Condominium-Statutory Implementation, 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1
(1963).
3. The ownership in severalty has all the attributes of other ownerships of real estate. Con-
dominium apartments can be separately owned, conveyed, devised, inherited, mortgaged and taxed.
See generally Kerr, supra note 2, at 2.
4. The common areas include those parts of the land and building intended for common use,
including foundations, main walls, roofs, halls, corridors, lobbies, stairways, elevators, and entr-
ances. See generally Kerr, supra note 2, at 2.
5. Kerr, supra note 2, at 1, 3.
6. Act of June 30, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, § 234, 75 Stat. 160 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1715(y) (1970).
7. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-50 (1970).
8. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. §§ 381.805-.910 (1971) (enacted in 1962); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 64-2701 to -2722 (Supp. 1970) (enacted in 1963). See generally Note, Condominium-A
Comparative Analysis of Condominium Statutes, 13 DE PAUL L. Rav. 111 (1963).
9. 24 C.F.R. § 234.26(b) (1962), as amended, 29 Fed. Reg. 12640 (1964). The regulations
are enacted pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1715(b) (1970).
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efficacy.' 0 As a management device, the unit owners' association is
charged with the care and administration of the owners' undivided inter-
ests in the common areas." In the event that the association, either
acting directly or through its agent, is negligent in the performance of
its responsibilities, 12 the question of the association's tort liability arises.
At common law an unincorporated association had no legally recogniza-
ble existence because legal personality was thought to be a sovereign gift
conferred only by incorporation. 13 The major consequence flowing from
the application of this doctrine was that the association was not subject
to suit and, therefore, bore no tort liability. In more recent times, limita-
tions of the common-law doctrine have emerged. Statutes permitting
suits against an unincorporated association now exist in a number of
states.14 The courts, however, have uniformly construed such statutes to
be procedural in nature, 15 giving the unincorporated association legal
personality for the purpose of permitting injured third parties to sue, but
leaving unchanged a substantive rule of liability that has repeatedly
barred suits against an association by one of its members.' 6 Known as
the "joint principal rule," 1 7 it is predicated upon the partnership princi-
ple that the members of an unincorporated association are engaged in a
10. See24C.F.R. § 234.26(0(1971).
11. See A. FERRER & K. STECHER, LAW OF CONDOMINIUM § 7 (1967); P. ROHAN & M.
RESKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.04(4)-(5) (1971).
12. The unit owners' association, for example, may elect a board of governors, which in turn
either employs persons to care for the common areas or contracts to have this work done.
13. Brown v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 8 F.2d 149 (E.D. La. 1925). Furthermore, courts
probably were fearful that membership might change during the suit, and were uncertain whether
the identity of association members could be established. See Developments in the Law-Judicial
Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REv. 983, 1081 (1963). The common-law
rule was strongly criticized. See, e.g., Dodd, Dogma and Practice in the Law of Associations, 42
HARV. L. REv. 977 (1929); Sturges, Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions, 33 YALE
L.J. 383 (1924).
14. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 24001 (West Supp. 1971). Nearly all condominium ena-
bling acts, however, are silent on the subject of tort liability of the unit owners' association. See P.
ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 11, § 10A.03(l). For statutes which do, however, make provision
for the tort liability of the unit owners' association see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 711.18 (1969); IDAHO
CODE § 55-1515 (Supp. 1966); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.50(22) (Supp. 1971); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 896-15 (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-26 (1966); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.37(2) (1969).
At least one authority, however, believes all these statutes are too vague and therefore inadequate.
See P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, supra note 11, § 1OA.03(3).
15. Inglis v. Operating Eng'rs Local 12, 18 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961), rev'dper
curiam, 58 Cal. 2d 269, 373 P.2d 467, 23 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1962); Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276,
101 N.E.2d 683 (1951). But see Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963).
16. See cases cited note 15 supra.
17. See Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations,
supra note 13, at 1088.
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joint enterprise and by virtue of that status are coprincipals with respect
to the acts of other members.18 Courts following this rule have held that
since the members are coprincipals with respect to the acts of one an-
other, the negligence of one member of the association is imputed to all
other members, including the injured member, and therefore the injured
member cannot sue the association for injuries resulting from another
member's negligence.1" They reason that by suing the association, an
injured member would, in effect, be suing himself to recover for negli-
gence that is imputed to him by virtue of his association membership.
Until recently, the joint principal rule possessed considerable vitality,
but a growing number of courts have altered the rule and granted an
injured member of an unincorporated association standing to sue the
association for its negligence. One group of courts has adopted the
"adverse interest" test of standing first applied in Taxicab Drivers'
Local 889 v. Pittman.2 0 In that case plaintiff, a union member, was
unjustifiably expelled from union membership. Since he was employed
in a closed shop, the expulsion also had the effect of causing the plaintiff
to lose his job. Plaintiff brought suit against the union for unlawful
interference with his employment. Rejecting the joint principal rule, the
court held that an association is liable to one of its members when the
acts done by the association are so clearly against the member's interest
that any inference of consent or coprincipalship on the part of the mem-
ber would be unreasonable.2 1 Although the adverse interest test has been
applied to cases involving wrongful expulsion from an association 22 and
to intentional torts,2 3 there is some doubt whether the test could be
extended to permit a member to recover for the negligence of his associa-
18. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Crystal Fountain Lodge, 80 Ga. 284, 4 S.E. 905 (1887) (action for
slander by an association against one of its members will not lie); Koogler v. Koogler, 127 Ohio
St. 57, 186 N.E. 725 (1933) (member replacing glass in window of association meeting hall has no
standing to sue when fire escape falls upon him); DeVillars v. Hessler, 363 Pa. 498, 70 A.2d 333
(1950) (member of fraternal organization injured by an exploding steam table cannot recover
against the organization); Hromek v. Gemeinde, 238 Wis. 204, 298 N.W. 587 (1941) (labor union
not liable for negligently placed platform in meeting ball). See also Crane, Liability of Unincorpor-
ated Association for Tortious Injury to a Member, 16 VAND. L. REv. 319 (1963).
19. See cases cited note 18 supra and accompanying text. See also 23 MiNN. L. REv. 666
(1939).
20. 322 P.2d 159 (Okla. 1957).
21. Id. at 167. See United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 160 Tex. 203, 328 S.W.2d 739
(1959); Fray v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters Union, 9 Wis. 2d 631, 101 N.W.2d 782 (1960); Bonsor
v. Musician's Union, [1956] A.C. 104 (1955); Crane, supra note 18, at 322.
22. See also International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzalez, 356 U.S. 617 (1958); Williams
v. Masters Local 2, 384 Pa. 413, 120 A.2d 896 (1956).
23. Inglis v. Operating Eng'rs Local 12, 18 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1961).
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tion.24 A second group of courts has adopted the "entity" test of stand-
ing applied in Marshall v. International Longshoreman's Union.25 In
that case a union member sued for injuries caused by the negligence of
the union in maintaining its parking lot. Abandoning the joint principal
rule in favor of the entity test, the court imposed liability on the union,
notwithstanding plaintiff's union membership. The court reasoned that
the union should be treated as a corporation since associations com-
monly act through elected officers and the individual members have little
or no control over either the officers' conduct or the daily operations of
the association. Accordingly, it concluded that, for the purpose of tort
liability, an association's property and agents are distinct from its mem-
bers.26 In spite of the entity test's conceptual compatibility with the
association's objective, observable behavior, and the test's apt analogy
to corporate activities,2 7 it has not been extended and has been applied
only to unincorporated labor unions.2
The court in the instant decision observed that recent legislation 9
and judicial decisions0 had diminished the viability of the joint principal
rule to the extent that a member's standing to sue an unincorporated
24. It should be pointed out that since the rights of a member vis-.-vis his association are
often determined by the rules of the association itself, the association could elicit consent to an act,
or prohibit objection to it, by its rule-making powers. See Finnegan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 76 N.J.
Super. 71, 84-85, 183 A.2d 779, 786 (1962). See also Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69
HARV. L. REV. 601 (1956); Crane supra note 18, at 322.
25. 57 Cal. 2d 781, 371 P.2d 987, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1962). See Developments in the
Law-Judicial Control of A clions of Private Associations, supra note 13, at 1092.
26. Cf. UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922) (applying the entity test when a
union charged with violation of the Sherman Act raised the joint principal rule as a defense).
27. It has been suggested that these 2 factors make the entity test preferable to the adverse
interest test. See Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations,
supra notel3, at 1092.
28. See. e.g., Daniels v. Sanitarium Ass'n Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 602, 381 P.2d 652, 30 Cal. Rptr.
828 (1963); Operating Eng'rs Local 12 v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d
504, 81 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1969); Benoit v. Local 299, Amalgamated Electrical Radio Workers, 150
Conn. 266, 188 A.2d 499 (1963); Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963);
Miazga v. Operating Eng'rs Local 18, 196 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964), affd, 2 Ohio St. 2d
49, 205 N.E.2d 884 (1965); Brawner v. Sanders, 244 Ore. 302,417 P.2d 1009 (1966).
29. The court referred to state statutes recognizing an unincorporated association's liability
to third persons and permitting execution on its property to enforce a judgment. CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 24001-02 (West Supp. 1971). It recognized that unincorporated associations could own prop-
erty, CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 21200-01 (West Supp. 1971); that they could engage in commercial
ventures, CAL. COMN1. CODE § 1201(28) (West Supp. 1971); and engage in labor activities, CAL.
LABOR CODE § 1117 (West 1971).
30. In addition to Marshall, the court referred to the following decisions: Orser v. Vierra,
252 Cal. App. 2d 660, 60 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1967) (association member not liable for unauthorized
intentional torts); Smith v. Hensley, 354 S.W.2d 744 (Ky. 1961) (partner can sue a business
partnership for the loss of a truck as the result of partnership negligence).
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association was now contingent upon the satisfaction of the two condi-
tions implicit in the Marshall decision-the separate legal existence of
the association apart from its members and the absence of direct control
by the members over the operations of the association. Applying these
criteria to the present facts, the court determined that both conditions
had been satisfied. It reasoned that since the individual units and com-
mon areas were susceptible to two different modes of control, 3' the unit
owners' association must exist apart from its members. In addition, the
court found that the California statute, like the condominium legislation
of other states, calls for the creation of a management association and,
as a result, effectively removes responsibility for the operation and main-
tenance of the common areas of the condominium from the direct con-
trol of the association members.3 2 Accordingly, the court held that plain-
tiff did have standing to sue the unit owners' association for its alleged
negligence and remanded the case for trial. A concurring judge noted
that the majority did not decide whether the property of an individual
unit owner could be used to satisfy a judgment against the association.
That judge found that a duty to procure liability insurance had been
delegated by contract to the association in the condominium plan. The
judge reasoned that an individual member should therefore be liable for
judgments against the association only to the extent of his proportionate
share in the common property.
33
The instant decision represents an extension of the entity theory of
standing to a rapidly growing form of organization, the condominium
unit owners' association. In viewing the unit owners' association as an
entity, the court recognized that concepts developed in the field of part-
nership law often have little relevance to large unincorporated associa-
tions, which normally act through elected officers and over which the
individual members have little or no actual control. The association
represents institutionalized behavior instead of individual activity;34 its
existence is perpetual and independent of any one member's approval.3
Thus the court's decision to treat the association as a legal "person"
and to grant the plaintiff in the instant case standing to sue is correct in
31. The units were controlled by each owner individually, and the common areas were con-
trolled by the association. No unit owner could individually direct the care of the common areas.
32. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1355, 1358 (West Supp. 1971), provide for management of the
project by a board of governors elected by the condominium owners' association. In plaintiff's
condominium the association members could vote by proxy and cumulative voting was allowed.
33. 17 Cal. App. 3d at 831, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (Roth, P.J., concurring).
34. For the first use of this analogy, although in a case involving different legal questions,




refusing to sacrifice reality to theoretical legal formalism.36 Moreover,
the instant court's fundamental approach seems more likely to achieve
a fair result for all parties concerned than application of either the joint
principal rule or the adverse interest test. First, it gives an injured asso-
ciation member who bears no actual responsibility for his own injury his
day in court and at least some chance of obtaining compensation for his
injury from the association, which in reality is the culpable party. Sec-
ondly, by using the twofold standard of the Marshall decision as a
condition precedent to the application of the entity test, the instant court
has not overlooked the situation in which the injured association mem-
ber does, in fact, exercise control over the association and its activities.
When that is the case, the injured party does stand as a joint principal
with other association members and the court should apply the joint
principal rule, refusing him standing to sue. Finally, of course, it should
be emphasized that a grant of standing to sue under the entity test is not
tantamount to the imposition of liability upon the association. The asso-
ciation still can interpose all of the defenses available to it that would
be available if a nonmember had brought suit.3 7
Unfortunately, as noted by the concurring opinion, 38 the instant
court did not decide whether the property of an individual unit owner
could be used to satisfy a judgment against the association.3 9 If the
instant court's decision only means that the plaintiff can recover a judg-
ment against the association, and that the substantive liabilities of asso-
ciation members are left unchanged, 0 it generally is agreed that as ten-
ants in common of the common areas, each of the unit owners would
be jointly and severally liable for torts committed on the condominium
grounds." That result would be undesirable in at least two respects.
While the joint principal rule bars an injured unit owner from recovery
against the association in all cases, the imposition of joint and several
liability reverses the hardship and results in the harsh treatment of the
36. See Marshall v. International Longshoreman's Union, 57 Cal. 2d 781, 371 P.2d 987, 22
Cal. Rptr. 211 (1962). See also B. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 62 (1928).
37. The association still would have at its disposal a formidable arsenal of common-law
defenses, including contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and nondelegable duties of
landowners. See P. ROHAN & M. REsKIN, supra note 11, § IOA.04(2).
38. See note 33 supra.
39. The majority did intimate in a footnote that it could be implied from CAL. CIVIL CODE
§ 1357 (West Supp. 1971) allowing liens for labor, services or materials, that a unit owner would
only be liable for his proportionate share of any liability arising out of the common areas. The
concurring opinion argued that the statute could not be extended to cover judgments in tort.
40. See cases cited note 15 supra.
41. See, e.g., 4 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 633.25 (P. Rohan ed. 1971).
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innocent unit owner, who is in no way responsible for the plaintiff's
misfortune. For example, a unit owner in a large condominium normally
would be unlikely to have any control over or knowledge of an unsafe
condition in the common areas. Nevertheless, if each owner is jointly and
severally liable, a plaintiff injured as a result of that condition could
enforce a judgment solely against the unit owner.42 Worse still is the
realization that if a right of contribution is not judicially or statutorily
authorized,4 3 the innocent unit owner would be unable to distribute lia-
bility among the other unit owners. Of the other hand, if the present
decision meant to alter the liabilities of the parties and hold that an
unincorporated association now incurs liability to the same extent that
a corporation does, the injured unit owner becomes the potential suf-
ferer. 44 The reason for this is that the assets of a small condominium
association could well be insufficient to indemnify a severely injured
plaintiff.4" In light of the inequities inherent in either possible approach,
it has been suggested that what could judicially evolve is a dual test of
liability.46 If the defendant association is small, the courts would treat
the unit owners as tenants in common, thus permitting joint and several
liability. Assuming the existence of a right of contribution this would
mean that liability could be distributed equally among all association
members. On the other hand, if the defendant is a large, well-endowed
association, they would treat the association as a separate entity and
impose liability on the basis of substantive corporate law. While in either
instance the likelihood of impartial treatment for all parties concerned
would be increased, the application of the dual test of liability raises an
obvious problem: what is the standard to distinguish between the small
association and the large one? Since no resolution of that problem is
42. Actually, the problem of whether an innocent unit owner should be jointly and severally
liable exists regardless of whether the plaintiff is a unit owner. Joint and several liability could work
in favor of the third-party plaintiff as well.
43. See Evan, The Administration of Insurance for Condominiums, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 204,
216. Only 9 jurisdictions have judicially authorized contribution. In 23 others, contribution statutes
have been enacted, some of which are quite limited. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 50
(4th ed. 1971).
44. It has been argued that simply incorporating the common areas would solve the potential
problem of joint and several liability. See Note, Condominiums: Incorporation of the Common
Elements-A Proposal, 23 VAND. L. REv. 321, 327 (1970). The suggestion has been generally
discredited. See, e.g., 4 R. POWELL, supra note 41, § 633.25, in which it is contended that the
corporate entity is still in fact the agent of the owners, and joint and several liability could be
predicated on the basis of undisclosed or partially disclosed principals.
45. See Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations,




readily apparent, the dual test lacks the degree of certainty necessary to
condominium law.17 Without the requisite definitions, condominium
unit owners would be unsure of their duties and liabilities to one another,
and the popularity of the condominium concept could suffer. Ideally, a
statutory resolution of this dilemma is needed. A satisfactory statute
would impose limited proportionate liability on unit owners coupled
with adequate, mandatory insurance purchased by the unit owners' asso-
ciation covering injury or property damage occuring in the common
areas. " The assets of the association would only be charged against an
uninsured liability or against liabilities in excess of coverage. In either
of those two instances, the unit owner would not be liable beyond his
proportionate share in the common areas. Equally important, there
would only be a small risk that a deserving plaintiff would go uncompen-
sated.
47. See P. ROHAN & M. RS KIN, supra note 11, § 10A.02(l).
48. Id. § 1OA.05(2). Several condominium enabling acts provide for the purchase of cas-
ualty insurance by the unit owners' association, but have no requirement concerning liability
insurance. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. § 381.885 (1971). Other enabling acts at least refer to the tort
liability of a unit owner. See statutes cited note 16 supra.
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